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I. INTRODUCTION
DISC stands for Domestic International Sales Corporation,
a tax avoidance device enacted in 1971 to reduce income taxes
for United States exporters.' Early in 1972 the European Com-
munity brought a lawsuit charging that DISC was an export
subsidy that violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).2 The United States responded by filing three
* 01988 by Robert E. Hudec.
** Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 501-507, 85 Stat. 535 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1982 & West Supp. 1988)).
2. GATT, a multilateral trade agreement, was originally concluded in
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counterclaims charging that, if DISC violated GATT, so did the
income tax laws of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The
four lawsuits, collectively known as the DISC case,3 were a
landmark event in the development of GATT law. The litiga-
tion dragged on for over twelve years, reaching impasse at al-
most every stage of the proceedings and finally ending with an
outcome that satisfied almost no one. Most observers view the
DISC case as the largest and most conspicuous failure in the
history of GATT's litigation procedure. 4 Because the DISC case
1947 among 23 governments. Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The agreement is re-
ferred to as the General Agreement or simply as GATT. At present 96 gov-
ernments are full signatories and about 30 others participate in the work of
GATT.
The text of the General Agreement has been amended several times since
1947, most recently in 1965. The official current text, together with an appen-
dix listing all amending protocols, is published by GATT in THE TEXT OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, U.N. Sales No. GATT/1986-4
(1986). A more widely distributed edition of the current official text is a 1969
printing issued as Volume IV of the GATT's official document series. See 4
CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [the series, annual edi-
tions of which are called Supplements, will hereinafter be cited as GATT,
BISD]. All citations to GATT in this Article are citations to the current offi-
cial text.
The term GATT also describes the international organization that ad-
ministers the General Agreement. GATT has a Secretariat of several hundred
people, a building in Geneva, a rather elaborate organizational structure of
committees and other working bodies, and an agenda of meetings daily
throughout the year. As this Article will show, the GATT's business also in-
cludes a lively practice of adjudicating legal disputes among its members.
The standard works in English on the history, law, and policy of GATT
are: G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLoMACY (1965); K. DAM,
THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); R.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); K. KOCK, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT 1947-1967 (1969); 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS
LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985); E.
McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2d ed. 1986). Professor John H. Jackson's
treatise, though dated, is the acknowledged bible.
3. Four GATT documents giving the reports of the various panels in the
DISC case are cited infra note 78.
4. The most detailed work on the history of GATT's adjudication proce-
dures is R. HUDEC, supra note 2. For recent works dealing with current issues
and practices in this area, see Bliss, GATT Dispute Settlement Reform in the
Uruguay Round Problems and Prospects, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31 (1987);
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987); Hudec,
GAYT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round An Unfinished Business, 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980); Petersmann, Experience and Proposals on
GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, in POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY IN THE NEW GATT ROUND (H. Corbet ed. 1987); Plank, An Unofficial De-
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is often the only example of GATT law enforcement known to
outsiders, its reputation has been responsible for a widespread
belief among policy makers that GATT law is not an effective
regulatory instrument.
At present the GATT is in the early stages of a major new
trade negotiation called the Uruguay Round,5 in which reform
of GATT litigation procedures has been declared a major objec-
tive. The memory of the DISC case continues to exert an influ-
ence over the participants in these negotiations. To the extent
these perceptions are inaccurate or incomplete, they could
cause participants to miss the target-to set expectations for
GATT law that are too low, or to address the wrong problems
in trying to strengthen it. It is a good time to set the record
straight about what actually happened in the DISC case, and
why it happened.
This Article seeks to present a complete record of the
DISC case from beginning to end. It tries not only to scrape
away misperceptions, but also to bring to light the many good
lessons that present-day negotiators can draw from this rich
and varied lode of GATT legal experience.
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE DISC LEGISLATION
The DISC legislation arose out of the deteriorating trade
and payments position of the United States in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. In August 1971 the United States responded to
the crisis by abandoning its promise to redeem United States
scription of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not, Swiss R. INT'L COMP.,
Feb. 1987, at 81, reprinted in 4 J. INT'L ARB. 53 (1987).
The leading work on the DISC case itself is a 1978 article by Professor
Jackson written just shortly after the panel decision. See Jackson, The Juris-
prudence of International Trade.- The Disc Case in GAT, 72 Am. J. INT'L L.
747 (1978).
5. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was opened in September
1986 by a Ministerial Declaration signed in Punta del Este, Uruguay. See
GATT, BISD, 33d Supp. at 19-52 (1987) (containing text of Declaration and de-
cisions defining negotiating agenda). The agenda is the most ambitious ever
undertaken by GATT. In addition to conventional negotiations on trade barri-
ers, including what promises to be the first serious effort to reduce distortions
in agricultural trade, the agenda calls for a comprehensive review of the legal
and institutional framework of GATT and a sweeping new initiative to extend
GATT legal disciplines to international transactions in services and to certain
trade-related issues of intellectual property rights and foreign investment poli-
cies. For a summary of the issues, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE
GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (1987); THE URUGUAY ROUND:
A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (J. Finger & A.
Olechowski eds. 1987).
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dollars for a fixed quantity of gold.6 At the same time, it an-
nounced a package of other trade and payments measures
designed to improve its balance-of-payments position. The pro-
posed DISC legislation was one element of the package.
DISC was an effort to encourage exports by lowering in-
come taxes on profits from exporting.7 The new law achieved
this objective in the following rather roundabout manner: it in-
vited exporters to create a separate domestic corporation, a
DISC, that would have no assets, no employees, and no business
function other than lowering taxes. The law then permitted
exporters to run export sales through the DISC by selling ex-
port goods to the DISC and then having the DISC resell them
to the ultimate foreign buyer. Profits from the two-step sale
could then be divided between the DISC and its parent com-
pany, according to one of several statutory formulas." The prof-
its attributed to the parent would be taxed as ordinary income
to the parent.9 One-half of the profits attributed to the DISC
would be deemed distributed back to the parent company,
which would pay income tax on them as well. No tax would be
paid on the other half of the DISC's profits. This tax liability
would be deferred. 10
Deferral was a tricky concept. It did not mean that the ex-
porter's income tax liability for the other half of the DISC's
profits was being totally forgiven. It meant that the liability
was merely being suspended for as long as the profits were re-
tained inside the DISC and were used only for export-related
business." No interest was charged on this suspended liability,
nor was there any limit on how long deferral might last. After
some hesitation business executives and their accountants be-
gan to ignore the contingent tax liability and to treat the yearly
tax savings as permanent gain that could be reported as corpo-
rate earnings. Under the 1971 version of the law, most United
6. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 14, col. 1 (city ed.) (text of President
Nixon's statement). On the monetary action and its consequences, see K.
DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 175-210 (1982).
7. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 535. For the
most comprehensive description of the original DISC law as enacted in 1971,
see Note, Domestic International Sales Corporation-A Tax Incentive for .Ex-
porters, 56 MINN. L. REV. 407, 412-29 (1972). What remains of the law is pres-
ently codified in I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1982 & West Supp. 1988).
8. Note, supra note 7, at 443-48.
9. See id. at 452-61.
10. Id.
11. See I.R.C. § 995.
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States exporters could defer taxes on up to 25% of total export
profits.'2 Under a less generous version enacted in 1976, the av-
erage deferral was about 17-18%.1
3
The DISC law was more than an emergency balance-of-
payments measure. More than a year before the August 1971
crisis, the United States Treasury Department had proposed
DISC as a tax reform measure,14 arguing that DISC was needed
to correct competitive disadvantages United States exporters
were experiencing due to differences between United States
and foreign tax laws. Although several disadvantages were
mentioned at the time of DISC's enactment,' 5 the United States
used only one as a justification for DISC in the GATT lawsuit
that followed: the higher income taxes that United States ex-
porters were being forced to pay due to differing tax treatment
of "tax-haven" export transactions.16
A tax haven is a country that offers low or zero income tax
12. The original 25% deferral could be achieved under a formula of the
original statute allocating half of all export income to the DISC and deferring
taxes on half of that. See I.R.C. § 994 (1982).
13. In 1976 the DISC law was amended so that tax benefits were confined
to profits earned on increased imports-that volume of exports which ex-
ceeded 67% of the average volume of exports during a four-year base period
beginning seven years before the tax year in question. Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1061, 90 Stat. 1649 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 995 (1982 & West Supp. 1988)). In 1982 the law was amended again to reduce
the share of DISC income eligible for tax deferral from 50% to 42.5%. Tax Eq-
uity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 204(a), 96 Stat.
423 (codifed as amended at I.R.C. § 291(a)(4) (West Supp. 1985)). The United
States estimated in a statement to the GATT Council that the amended DISC
resulted in deferral of approximately 17-18% of total export income. GATT
Doc. C/M/159 (June 29-30, 1982 mtg.) at 8; see also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., DEFICrr REDUCTION AcT OF 1984: EXPLANA-
TION OF PROVIsIONS 633 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 SENATE
REPORT].
14. The DISC proposal was attached to the proposed Trade Act of 1970.
See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, H782-5, 91sT CONG., 2D SESs., DISC
PROPOSAL OF THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT (Comm. Print 1970). The 1970
bill containing DISC passed the House, H.R. 18,970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 401-
408, 116 CONG. REC. 38,222-27 (1970), but failed to pass the Senate.
15. The long-standing complaint about "'border tax' adjustments," the ac-
cepted practice of remitting value-added and other such taxes on exported
goods and of imposing such taxes on imports, received almost equal attention
during the process of enactment. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 750-51. The au-
thor found no mention of this justification in the documents of the GATT
lawsuit.
16. See, e.g., GATT Doc. C/M/87 (May 29, 1973 mtg.) at 5 (United States
testimony before GATT that 'DISC provisions merely extended to United
States exporters a type of tax treatment comparable to that which was avail-
able to exporters... in many other countries.").
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rates to certain firms doing business there, often to foreign-
owned firms the government seeks to attract. Exporters use
tax havens in much the same way that DISCs were designed to
be used. They set up a branch or wholly owned subsidiary cor-
poration inside the tax-haven country. They then sell export
goods at the lowest possible price to the tax-haven branch or
subsidiary, which resells the goods to the ultimate foreign
buyer. The sale to the subsidiary is normally just a paper trans-
action, with the goods moving directly from the exporter to the
ultimate foreign buyer. The purpose of the fictitious
sale-resale transaction is to shift some of the export profits to
the branch or subsidiary in the tax-haven country, where local
tax laws impose little or no income tax. If the tax laws of the
home country do not intrude, the exporter realizes a tax saving
which, according to United States estimates at the time, could
be as much or more than the savings resulting from tax defer-
ral under DISC.'7
The income tax laws of many countries did in fact permit
exporters to reduce taxes on export income by employing tax-
haven export transactions. Following what is called the "terri-
toriality" principle, these laws did not tax income earned
outside the country's territory, nor did they impose more than a
token tax on foreign earnings remitted to the home country.'8
The United States Internal Revenue Code did not allow such
tax savings, however. Under a 1962 amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code known as Subpart F, United States exporters
were required to pay income taxes on the export income of tax-
haven subsidiaries that conducted no manufacturing in the tax-
haven country. 19 Because of Subpart F, most United States ex-
porters were paying greater income taxes on their export in-
come than were tax-haven exporters from countries following
17. See GATT Doe. C/M/159 (June 29-30, 1982 mtg.) at 8 (United States
Statement).
18. The territoriality principle is discussed in detail in the panel reports
on the French, Belgian, and Netherlands laws. See infra note 78.
19. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12, 76 Stat. 1006-27 (codified
at I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982)). Before 1962 United States exporters had been able
to benefit from tax-haven transactions, provided they were constructed in a
certain way. Unlike some European tax laws that do not tax the income of a
company's branches in other countries, United States law would not treat the
income of a tax-haven entity as separate from the parent's unless it was a sep-
arate corporation incorporated abroad. And unlike some European laws that
allow the parent to repatriate the foreign profits without being taxed, United
States law treated repatriated profits as taxable income to the parent. To es-
cape income taxation, the tax-haven subsidiary's income had to remain abroad.
1448 [Vol. 72:1443
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the territoriality principle. The DISC legislation was meant to
correct this relative disadvantage.20
The fact that DISC was rooted in a concern for tax parity
would be of critical importance in the GATT litigation that fol-
lowed. Because the United States Treasury Department be-
lieved strongly in the legitimacy of this objective, it would
defend DISC with an intensity considerably greater than gov-
ernments normally expend on ordinary beggar-thy-neighbor
trade measures. Indeed, the United States would never yield
on the legitimacy of DISC's basic purpose.
Unfortunately, in pursuing this tax parity objective the
United States government could not resist trying to capture a
small additional advantage as well. The simplest way to restore
tax-haven benefits for United States exporters would have been
to repeal the relevant provisions of Subpart F, thereby restor-
ing the exporter's ability to exclude the income of foreign sub-
sidiaries operating in tax-haven countries. Instead, the new law
created a domestic tax haven-the DISC-and limited the tax
benefits to sales made through that domestic entity. The rea-
son for establishing a domestic tax haven was to reduce the out-
flow of dollars by keeping all export profits within the United
States.21 The domestic character of DISC distinguished it from
tax-haven benefits available under the territoriality principle.
The distinction would be DISC's undoing in GATT.
B. THE GATT LEGAL PROBLEM
The DISC law raised an issue of conformity with the
United States's legal obligations under the GATT. GATT Arti-
cle XVI:4 prohibits governments from granting subsidies on the
export of industrial products:
[C]ontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly
any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a pri-
mary product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for ex-
port at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market.
2 2
20. For example, a Treasury Department publication described DISC as
"an effort to increase exports and improve balance of payments by placing
U.S. exports on a more equal tax footing with their foreign counterparts."
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE OPERATION ANi) EFFECT OF THE DOmEsTIc
INT'L SALES CORP. LEGIs., 1974 ANN. REP. 1 (1976).
21. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 751.
22. GATT, BISD, Vol. 4, at 27. The term "primary product" is defined in
Annex I to the text of the General Agreement as "any product of farm, forest
or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such
processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial
1988] 1449
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In GATT law the term subsidy has never been expressly de-
fined. Its core concept is a government-created advantage that
distorts the recipient's market behavior in favor of the subsi-
dized transaction. A 1960 report adopted by the GATT Con-
tracting Parties concluded that selective "remission" or
"exemption" of income taxes with respect to export sales was a
subsidy on exports under Article XVI:4.2 The DISC's poten-
tially infinite "deferral" of income taxes on export sales ap-
peared to have the same purpose and the same effect.
Although Article XVI:4 was in force for only seventeen coun-
tries in 1971, the United States was one of those seventeen.24
There were three possible defenses to the charge that
DISC violated Article XVI:4. The most obvious was the claim
of substantial economic equivalence: DISC merely gave United
States exporters the same tax benefits that exporters in other
countries derived from tax-haven transactions under the terri-
toriality principle.2 Under the territoriality principle, how-
ever, exporters could shield income from taxation only to the
extent they could demonstrate that the income was earned by
some economic activity located abroad, whereas the DISC law
required no such foreign activity. The success of this first de-
fense would depend on whether this domestic-foreign distinc-
tion made any difference.
The other two possible defenses were of a more technical
character. One was weak, the other strong. The weak techni-
cal defense was based on the fact that DISC merely deferred
tax liability, rather than granting an outright "exemption" or
"remission"-the terms used to describe prohibited tax subsi-
dies in the 1960 GATT report. The defense was weak because
the distinction was almost wholly lacking in substance. The
deferral of taxes on DISC income was intended to create ex-
actly the same sort of market-distorting economic incentive as
volume in international trade." Id. Ad Art. XVI, § B, 2, at 68. A different
obligation exists with regard to export subsidies on primary products. GATT
Article XVI:3 provides that governments should "seek to avoid" using such
subsidies in general, and that they must not use subsidies that result in the
subsidizing party having "more than an equitable share of world export trade
in that product." Id. at 26-27. Although DISC applied to exports of primary as
well as nonprimary products, no claim that DISC violated Article XVI:3 was
ever made.
23. GATT, BISD, 9th Supp. at 186-87 (1961).
24. The history leading to adoption of GATT Article XVI:4 by only a part
of the GATT membership is discussed in J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 372-74.
The drafting history of Article XVI:4 is described at length infra notes 99-120.
25. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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an outright exemption. Moreover, it was actually having that
effect, because most United States exporters were treating the
tax saving from deferral as though it was a permanent exemp-
tion. The only real question raised by this defense was whether
the GATT's legal process would have enough decision-making
capacity to cut through the smokescreen.
The stronger technical defense arose from the seldom no-
ticed condition in Article XVI:4, which prohibits an export sub-
sidy only when it "results in the sale of such product for export
at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market. '26 Demonstrating
this price effect-referred to as the bilevel pricing require-
ment-requires showing that the export price of the subsidized
product is lower than its domestic price and the price difference
"results" from the subsidy. In most cases each element of this
price effect is extremely difficult to prove.
Proving that export prices are lower than domestic prices
is seldom easy, because for any product there are usually many
transactions at different prices in both markets, each having
distinctive characteristics such as quantity, credit terms, and de-
livery times that could justify part or all of the price difference.
Proving that a lower export price is the "result" of an export
subsidy is even more difficult. Most export prices are set by
market forces in the buyer's country. If exports occur, they
will occur at that market price, whether or not there is an ex-
port subsidy. In most cases, therefore, the only effect of an ex-
port subsidy will be to increase the volume of exports by
increasing the profitability of sales at the going price. More-
over, even in those cases when an export subsidy can have a
causal effect-that is, when the price in the export market is
too low to cover costs by itself-it is extremely unlikely that an
income tax subsidy like DISC could have such an effect, be-
cause relief from income tax liability can almost never change a
losing transaction into a profitable one.2 7
Notwithstanding its nearly insurmountable proof require-
ments, the bilevel pricing defense had one glaring weakness. It
made no sense as a matter of policy. The reason for barring ex-
26. GATT, BISD, Vol. 4, at 27.
27. The one case in which income tax subsidies could have a two-price ef-
fect is the case in which the lower export price would yield some profit but not
an adequate rate of return. A lower income tax rate possibly could raise the
rate of return on exports to a point equal to or greater than the rate of return
on higher-priced domestic sales, in which case the income tax subsidy would
be inducing lower-price export sales.
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port subsidies was that they harmed producers in the importing
country. An export subsidy could create such harmful effects
whether or not it caused lower export prices, simply by increas-
ing the volume of exports. At the time the DISC case began,
most of the countries obligated under Article XVI:4 shared this
view. Just a few years later, in 1979, they would in fact elimi-
nate the bilevel pricing requirement by adopting a new Subsi-
dies Code in which Article XVI:4 would be rewritten without
it. 28
The bilevel pricing defense would thus pose a classic test
for the GATT legal system: a norm that is clearly stated in the
legal text, opposed by an equally clear consensus that the norm
is wrong.
II. FROM COMPLAINT TO LEGAL RULING: 1971-1976
A. GATT Is TOLD TO MIND ITS OwN BUSINESS
The DISC case began in an atmosphere of major crisis.
The United States repudiation of its promise to redeem dollars
in gold shook the world trading system, and the shock was fur-
ther magnified by the package of other trade distorting meas-
ures announced at the same time. President Nixon announced
the United States action on August 15, 1971.29 The United
States gave formal notice in GATT the following day,30 and
eight days later the GATT Council met in a two-day emergency
session.3' The Council created a working party that met from
the 6th to the 11th of September to examine the problem in
greater depth, and the working party's report was then dis-
28. The Subsidies Code is the shorthand title for the Agreement on Inter-
pretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter Subsidies Code], 31 U.S.T. 513,
T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204, reprinted in GAITT, BISD, 26th Supp. at
56-83 (1980), and in THE TEXTS OF THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS, U.N.
Sales No. GATT/1986-5 (1986) [hereinafter TOKYO ROUND TExTS]. The Subsi-
dies Code is a side agreement among approximately 30 of the GATT's most im-
portant member countries-all the developed country members, most of whom
were signatories of Article XVI:4, and about 10 key developing countries, most
of whom were not. Although called an "interpretation," in practical terms it
supplants Articles VI and XVI in legal relations among signatories, tightening
some obligations and adding others.
The Article XVI:4 obligation on export subsidies is found in Article 9:1 of
the Subsidies Code. Article 9:1 says, without qualification, "Signatories shall
not grant export subsidies on products other than certain primary products."
GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. at 68 (1980); TOKYO RoUND TEXTs, supra, at 64.
29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
30. GATT Doc. L/3567 (Aug. 16, 1971).
31. GATT Doc. C/M/71 (Aug. 24-25, 1971 mtg.).
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cussed at another special Council meeting on September 16th.3 2
The initial United States notice to GATT on August 16th
had mentioned DISC as one of the emergency measures being
proposed,33 but at the Council meeting the following week, the
United States delegation changed course and tried to block fur-
ther discussion of DISC. The United States's opening state-
ment failed to mention DISC. At the end of the meeting,
governments agreed to appoint a working party to investigate
"measures in the United States Programme of a non-monetary
nature which have a direct impact on international trade."3
4
The United States stated that it would agree to the working
party, but only on the understanding that the "programme" to
be investigated would be the list of measures discussed in its
opening statement-the list that did not include DISC.
35
When the working party met, other governments refused
to exclude DISC from the discussion. The European Commu-
nity and Canada contended that DISC would be GATT-illegal, 3
6
and Switzerland and Sweden added the warning that an econ-
omy-wide tax benefit like DISC, once enacted, would be next to
impossible to repeal.37 The working party recorded its discus-
sion of the DISC proposal in a separate GATT document.38
The United States objected to the working party discussion of
DISC, objected to the issuance of the GATT document record-
ing the discussion, and objected to the Council's subsequent de-
cision to "take note" of the document.3 9
The conspicuously uncooperative attitude of the United
States was apparently due to a jurisdictional problem in Wash-
ington. In the United States government, as in most others, a
jurisdictional line exists between matters that belong to the fi-
nance ministry (the Treasury Department) and those which be-
32. The report of the working party was divided into three documents: a
report on the 10% tariff surcharge that the United States had imposed August
15, 1971, GATT Doc. L/3573 (Sept. 13, 1971), reprinted in GATT, BISD, 18th
Supp. at 212-23 (1972); an exchange of views about DISC, GATT Doc. L/3574
(Sept. 13, 1971); and a report on the proposed Job Development Tax Credit,
GATT Doc. L/3575 (Sept. 13, 1971). In the Council meeting that followed, the
Council "adopted" the surcharge report and "took note" of the latter two doc-
uments. GATT Doc. C/M/72 (Sept. 16, 1971 mtg.) at 4-5.
33. GATT Doc. L/3567 (Aug. 16, 1971) at 2.
34. GATT Doc. C/M/71 (Aug. 24-25, 1971 mtg.) at 20.
35. Id. at 21.
36. GATT Doc. L/3574 (Sept. 13, 1971) at 1-2.
37. Id. at 2.
38. GATT Doc. L/3574 (Sept. 13, 1971).
39. See id.; GATT Doc. C/M/72 (Sept. 16, 1971 mtg.) at 4-5.
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long to the trade ministry (the Office of the United States
Trade Representative). Trade ministries have jurisdiction over
trade measures, and they deal with their problems in GATT.
Finance ministries deal in the more elite area of fiscal and
monetary matters and take their problems to international fora
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).40
Finance ministers tend to outrank trade ministers and so tend
to dictate where the jurisdictional line is drawn. In this case
the United States Treasury Department viewed DISC as an ex-
ercise of Treasury Department responsibility-the elimination
of economic frictions due to the interface of national tax sys-
tems. Treasury officials had their own system of international
relations for dealing with such issues. They did not need the
GATT to tell them how to do their job.
The Treasury Department eventually had to bow to the
United States's international obligations requiring that export
subsidies, including tax subsidies, be dealt with in GATT. It did
so only grudgingly, however, and only on its own terms, mak-
ing the sort of demands on GATT that finance ministries usu-
ally make when dealing with trade ministries. Within the
United States government, the Treasury Department would in-
sist on managing the GATT lawsuit itself.41 It would devise the
40. The OECD, which came into existence in 1961 as the successor to the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), see infra note 116,
is an organization of the world's developed countries devoted to economic pol-
icy issues ranging from economic forecasting to development assistance, in-
cluding a substantial workload relating to tax policy questions of the kind
involved in the DISC case. See M. CAMPs, "FIRST WORLD" RELATIONSHIPS:
THE ROLE OF THE OECD (1984). The IMF, established in 1944, is the world's
primary institution, regulatory and financial, in the area of international mon-
etary affairs. See A. HOOKE, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ITs
EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION, AND AcTrivrnms, IMF PAMPHLET SERIES No. 37 (2d
ed. 1982).
41. It would, for example, insist that the Treasury Department's General
Counsel argue all four cases before the GATT panel-the only time, to the au-
thor's knowledge, that the United States has ever been represented by an
outside department in such proceedings. Following the panel decisions in 1976,
Treasury's management of the case diminished, and by the 1980s it found itself
on the outside, proposing that DISC be abandoned and being overruled by
trade policy officials who insisted on continuing to defend DISC. See infra
text accompanying notes 162-63, 178.
The documentary evidence of Treasury's management of the case is not
yet derestricted. The account here is based on confidential interviews with
participants and observers. Owing to the frequently restricted nature of infor-
mation pertaining to GATT litigation, the author does not cite individual inter-
viewees by name.
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strategy of bringing three countercomplaints against the terri-
toriality tax systems of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands,
a strategy that seemed to be motivated in large part by tax pol-
icy irritants lying outside the GATT's normal sphere of activity
and which seemed at times to view the GATT legal process
more as a hostage to these concerns than a forum for adjudicat-
ing them. Within GATT the Treasury Department would insist
on making the GATT adjudication procedures measure up to fi-
nance ministry standards. It would demand that the four cases
be treated as one case to be heard by the same panel at the
same time, so that Treasury's point about the identity between
DISC and the three European tax systems would be sure to be
understood. Once that was done, Treasury would then insist
that the panel include at least one tax expert-someone with
the capacity to understand the finer points of international tax
policy. The United States would not agree to participate until
these demands were satisfied.
The refusal to talk about DISC in these early GATT meet-
ings was a preview of the abnormal difficulties that would be
encountered due to the divided responsibility for DISC within
the United States government. The problem might have been
anticipated. Governments act through their bureaucracies. The
farther a particular bureaucracy is removed from the day-to-
day workings of the international legal institution in question,
the greater the difficulty that institution will have in influenc-
ing its behavior.
B. THE COMPLAINT AND THE COUNTERCLAIMS
The DISC law was enacted in late 1971 and came into force
at the beginning of 1972. For other GATT governments, the
first issue was whether to file a formal legal complaint or to
continue exerting diplomatic pressure. Given the climate of
GATT legal policy in early 1972, a legal complaint was by no
means a foregone conclusion. The GATT was just emerging
from a period of rather intense antilegalism. During the last
half of the 1960s, the GATT's developed-country leadership had
argued with increasing fervor that governments should settle
trade problems by negotiation rather than by legal rulings.42
42. The antilegalist period and the efforts to reverse it in the early 1970s
are recounted in R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 216-40. For a contemporary ac-
count of the legal doldrums, see Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1336-68
(1971).
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As a consequence the GATT's adjudication procedures had
been essentially dormant from 1963 to 1970.
The issue posed a particularly difficult choice for the Euro-
pean Community. The Community had been the chief propo-
nent of the antilegalist point of view, partly out of conviction
and partly out of concern to avoid GATT legal rulings against
certain imperfections in its newly formed customs union.43 In
keeping with this position, the Community had never before
filed a GATT legal complaint. On the other hand, continued
legal restraint was beginning to pose dangers. The United
States had started to move away from the antilegalist position
in the early 1970s, filing one GATT legal complaint in 1969,
three in 1970, and three more in 1972." These lawsuits were, at
least in part, a genuine effort to revitalize the GATT adjudica-
tion machinery to improve GATT rule enforcement. 45 The
43. On the possible impact of GATT on Community law, see Ehlermann,
Application of GATT Rules in the European Community, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND GATT 127-40 (M. Hilf, F. Jacobs & E. Petersmann eds. 1986);
Petersmann, International and European Foreign Trade Law: GA 7T Dispute
Settlement Against the EEC, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 441 (1985).
44. GATT legal complaints are usually identified in indexes and in secon-
dary literature by a title, chosen by the author, that gives the name of the de-
fendant and a brief description of the practice complained of. (Formal GATT
documents pertaining to a case sometimes use such titles, sometimes not.)
Usually the "complaint" is the first public announcement of an intent to in-
voke the GATT's adjudication procedure. The titles and complaints of the
United States's GATT lawsuits from 1969-1972 were: United Kingdom" Dollar
Area Quotas, GATT Doc. L/3753 (Oct. 17, 1972); France: Import Restrictions,
GATT Doc. L/3744 (Sept. 12, 1972); European Community: Compensatory
Taxes on Imports, GATT Doc. L/3715 (June 30, 1972); Jamaica: Increase in
Margins of Preference, GATT Doc. L/3440 (Sept. 18, 1970); Denmark- Import
Restrictions. on Grains, GATT Doc. L/3436 (Sept. 14, 1970); Greece: Tarkff
Preferences, GATT Doc. L/3384 (Apr. 16, 1970); Italy: Administrative and Sta-
tistical Fees, GATT Doc. L/3279 (Dec. 1, 1969).
According to the author's count based on unpublished data, GATT govern-
ments filed 165 legal complaints in the first 40 years of GATT's history (1948-
1987), half of which were filed in the last 11 years. See infra note 75. Cur-
rently, three comprehensive lists of GATT legal complaints have been pub-
lished, each using slightly different criteria to define legal claims: GATT,
ANALYTICAL INDEX-NOTES ON THE DRAFTING, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-
TION OF THE ARTICLES OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT at XXIII-87 to -128 (1986);
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUB. No. 1793, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIvE-
NESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT AND THE TOKYO
ROUND AGREEMENTS, App. I at I-1 to -32 (1985) [hereinafter USITC REPORT];
R. HUDEC, supra note 2, App. A at 275-96.
45. The lawsuits were also meant to serve a domestic political purpose,
smoothing the way for new trade legislation by assuring Congress that the Ad-
ministration was vigorously defending United States interests. The author in-
terviewed several United States officials who worked on these cases, including
some who served on the interagency committee charged with identifying legal
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European Community was becoming a prime target of this new
legal policy; two of the 1972 lawsuits were against the Commu-
nity, and several other legal controversies were brewing, partic-
ularly in the sensitive area of agricultural trade.46 Continued
legal restraint in the face of this aggressiveness might simply
encourage more of it. Giving the United States a taste of its
own medicine might be a better way to induce some
moderation.47
The European Community decided in favor of litigation.
On February 4, 1972, the Community presented the United
States with a request for bilateral consultations under GATT
Article XXIII:1, the first step in a GAT T lawsuit.48 The com-
plaint had no immediate effect on the United States's legal ar-
dor. After a brief delay, the United States responded in May by
making a similar request for Article XXIII:1 consultations with
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, claiming that the terri-
toriality features of their income tax laws resulted in at least
the same tax subsidy to their exporters that DISC granted to
United States exporters.49
The strategy behind the three United States counterclaims
appeared ambivalent, an ambivalence that was characteristic of
DISC itself. On the one hand, the DISC was established policy,
and, as a law enacted by the United States Congress, it had to
be defended. On the other hand, no one had ever viewed DISC
as optimal tax policy; it was an acknowledged evil made neces-
claims that could be brought in GATT. The complaints strategy had been es-
tablished before the claims themselves were identified.
46. The two complaints, one against the Community and the other against
France, are cited supra note 44. Most prominent among the legal controver-
sies not adjudicated were an attack on the Community's system of preferential
tariffs on citrus products for Mediterranean suppliers and several attacks on
discriminatory association agreements with neighboring nonmember countries.
See R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 232-33.
47. For one contemporary account that credits this counterpunching strat-
egy, see Delston, Common Market Challenge to DISC Treasury's Words Come
Back to Haunt Americans, TAX NOTES, Apr. 5, 1976, at 7, 9. The author has
come to the same conclusion about the probable purpose of a rash of GATT
legal complaints by the European Community in the early 1980s. Hudec, Legal
Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960-1985, in ISSUES IN US-EC
TRADE RELATIONS 43-44 (R. Baldwin, A. Sapin & C. Hamilton eds.) (forthcom-
ing from University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic
Research).
48. The consultation request was made bilaterally without notice to
GATT. It is described in the Community's subsequent Article XXIII:2 com-
plaint, GATT Doc. L/3851 (May 1, 1973).
49. The consultation request is described in the United States subsequent
Article XXIII:2 complaint, GATT Doc. L/3860 (May 17, 1973).
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sary by the evils of other tax laws. If tax policy experts could
have had their way, they would have followed the Subpart F
policy to the end, eliminating both DISC and the European ter-
ritoriality systems.
On the face of it, the three United States counterclaims
seemed primarily intended to defend DISC by linking it to the
territoriality principle. Territoriality was a basic principle in
the tax laws of many GATT countries; it governed taxation of
every kind of foreign income and could not have been changed
without major upheaval. If DISC could be shown to be
equivalent to territoriality, the GATT would probably not be
able to declare DISC illegal because countries that followed the
territoriality principle would not be prepared to accept the
same legal principle applied to themselves. Many elements of
the United States legal position tended to confirm this primar-
ily defensive strategy, for in defending DISC the United States
frequently presented legal arguments that undercut the
charges of legal invalidity made in its counterclaims.5 0
50. One of the most important DISC defenses undercutting the counter-
claims was the bilevel pricing defense; the argument that bilevel price effects
must be demonstrated would apply equally to the claim against the French,
Belgian, and Netherlands income tax subsidies, so that the difficulty of demon-
strating such price effects would tend to exonerate them as well. The United
States's oscillating position on bilevel pricing is discussed in detail infra note
123.
Another DISC defense that undercut the counterclaims was the United
States position on "nullification and impairment." The complaints procedure
of GATT Article XXIII is somewhat unusual in that the ultimate wrong is not
that the other party has violated its obligations, but that "benefits under the
Agreement have been nullified or impaired" by the conduct of the other party.
4 GATT, BISD at 39. Although this phrase can be read to suggest that GATT
legal wrongs are actionable only if they cause economic damage, the GATT
has generally rejected that view on the ground that economic damage is usu-
ally so difficult to prove that it would be difficult ever to make a clear legal
ruling. The damage-only view was rejected clearly in a 1962 panel ruling that
all GATT violations constitute "prima facie .... nullification or impairment."
Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, reprinted in GATT, BISD, 11th Supp.
at 95 (1963). The three United States counterclaims had employed the Uru-
guayan Recourse precedent, charging that the violations of Article XVI:4
amounted to prima facie nullification. See GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. at 124-25
(1977) (France); id. at 134 (Belgium); id. at 144-45 (Netherlands). In the DISC
case, however, the United States tried to defend DISC by arguing that "nullifi-
cation or impairment" required a showing of actual trade damage-a require-
ment which, if applied to the three counterclaims, would have torpedoed them
as well. Id. at 112 (panel report on DISC).
A third defense of DISC that undercut the counterclaims was the United
States's argument that the territorial tax systems of France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands, and others as well, constituted "subsequent practices of the par-
ties" under the principles of the Vienna Convention, so that GATT Article
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On occasion, however, another voice appeared to be speak-
ing for the United States, attempting to sustain the United
States counterclaims at the expense of DISC. The United
States repeatedly presented its case in terms of mutual illegal-
ity-"If DISC is illegal, then so are the European systems"-,
suggesting a willingness to accept the conclusion that both were
illegal. On occasion, the United States also seemed willing to
place DISC at risk by pressing arguments against the legality of
the European tax systems that undercut the legal defense of
DISC.51
One of the irritants that drew United States officials into
this more dangerous attacking posture was their conviction that
the European tax systems were not merely permitting tax-ha-
ven operations, but were actively helping exporters to enlarge
that tax advantage by adopting very generous "arm's length
pricing" rules for tax-haven transactions. United States tax of-
ficials, who took some pride in their own fairly rigorous arm's
length pricing rules, 52 found it particularly irritating to be ac-
cused of subsidizing by tax officials who, they believed, were ac-
tively promoting even worse practices at home.53
As often happens when governments engage in interna-
tional litigation, the United States never succeeded in working
out a legal position that reconciled its conflicting objectives.
The ambivalence in the United States legal position would play
an important part in the stop-and-go quality of the litigation
that followed. United States concessions would contribute to
the legal finding against DISC, and a further series of conces-
XVI:4 must be interpreted as permitting the sort of tax advantages to export-
ers under such systems. Id. at 106-07. When the European Community
pointed out that this legal theory was inconsistent with the United States
claims that the tax systems of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were
GATT-illegal, the United States acknowledged that this was so, and at this
point virtually abandoned the counterclaims by explaining that they had been
filed merely to assure that if the United States's arguments were rejected and
DISC was found GATT-illegal, then the other tax systems would also have to
be ruled illegal. Id. at 108.
51. The chief example was a gamble that risked waiving the bilevel pric-
ing defense for DISC in order to circumvent it in the three counterclaims. See
infra text accompanying note 123.
52. The United States provision is I.R.C. § 482 (1982).
53. In interviews with United States officials connected with the case, the
author was told that Treasury officials had a large dossier on European short-
comings in this area, including published administrative guidelines in France
expressly calling for relaxation of arm's length pricing standards when export
transactions were involved. To be sure, the DISC legislation had copied these
practices by adopting arbitrary rules for allocating income between parent and
DISC. See supra note 12.
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sions would eventually lead to approval of that ruling. Yet the
underlying strategy of defending DISC was never abandoned
and would reemerge from time to time to throw the case back
into deadlock just when it seemed ready for settlement.
All this was still in the future, however. First, the com-
plaints had to move forward to adjudication. This would take
almost four more years.
C. ESTABLISHING THE PROCEDURE
The two sets of bilateral consultations were not held until
July 1972, a delay of several months caused by the United
States's insistence on- having its counterclaims discussed at the
same time. By itself, the demand for parallel treatment may
not have been unreasonable, for when a measure like DISC has
been enacted expressly for the purpose of offsetting a perceived
inequity in the practices of other governments, it is probably
counterproductive to force the defendant government to treat
its own measure in isolation from those it was meant to
counter.1 What was ominous in this delay, however, was the
underlying assumption that the United States was entitled to
dictate the procedure.
The July 1972 consultations did not produce a solution.
The European Community then allowed the issue to remain
dormant for almost a year. The reasons for the delay were
never explained. The Community may have had second
thoughts about compromising its antilegalist position; it may
have needed more time to coordinate positions with the tax au-
thorities of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; or it may
simply have wanted to wait and see whether opposition to
DISC within the United States government would lead to re-
peal for internal tax policy reasons. 55
54. Generally speaking, it is a mistake to use the amount of time taken in
the early phase of a lawsuit as a measure of the adjudication procedure's effi-
cacy. The value of speed depends on the nature of the government policy be-
ing challenged. If the policy is already cast in cement, the consultation will be
a formality, and the quicker it is done the better. On the other hand, a GATT
legal claim often creates an opportunity for reconsideration by the defendant
government, and in these cases a too-rapid procedure will be counterproduc-
tive if it forces consultations before the government has time to change its
policy.
55. From the beginning, DISC had engendered considerable criticism as a
matter of tax policy. For example, the original 1971 law was criticised on the
ground that it granted tax exemptions on all export profits, an unnecessary
windfall for exporters which had no relation to whether or not they increased
exports in the future. For a general summary of the criticisms against DISC,
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The possibility the United States might repeal DISC for
reasons of tax policy would arise again at several points in the
proceedings, and each time it would cause GATT procedures to
slow down. In the typical GATT lawsuit, the presence of vigor-
ous domestic opposition to the challenged trade measure usu-
ally has the opposite effect, inciting the complaining
government to press the GATT legal action more vigorously to
provide additional ammunition for the domestic opposition.
Whenever an assault on DISC was mounted in Washington,
however, the Community would usually delay further GATT
action, perferring, it seemed, to allow DISC to destroy itself.
On May 1, 1973, the Community stopped waiting and re-
quested the Contracting Parties to rule under GATT Article
XXIII:2 on its claim that DISC violated Article XVI:4.56 About
two weeks later, the United States replied with its own Article
XXIII:2 request, asking the Contracting Parties to rule on its
three counterclaims charging the same violation against the in-
come tax laws of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.5 7
It took three months for the parties to reach agreement on
the procedure for handling these complaints. The Community
requested that the normal procedure be followed by appointing
a separate panel to rule on the legal issues in each complaint.58
Although the United States normally supported a complaining
country's right to invoke the panel procedure,59 in this case it
proposed deferring the litigation phase for six months so that a
negotiating body, such as a working party consisting of all in-
terested governments, could consider the general legal issue
first.60 The United States explained that the practice of not
taxing export income was common to many other tax systems,
and so a negotiating body consisting of all interested parties
might better be able to identify a general solution acceptable to
see S. SuRREY, P. MCDANIEL & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM FOR 1976,
at 89-99 (1976).
56. GATT Doc. L/3851 (May 1, 1973).
57. GATT Doc. L/3860 (May 17, 1973).
58. GATT Doc. C/M/87 (May 29, 1973 mtg.) at 3.
59. The year before, for example, the United States had requested a panel
to consider certain European Community "compensatory taxes" that violated
tariff bindings. GATT Doc. L/3715 (June 30, 1972). The Community admitted
the violation and said a panel was not necessary because the taxes were al-
ready scheduled for removal in a few months. The United States insisted on
the panel, however, "in accordance with the procedure traditionally adopted in
cases where the parties concerned had not succeeded in settling their differ-
ences." GATT Doc. C/M/79 (July 26, 1972 mtg.) at 10-11. The Community
prevailed.
60. GATT Doc. C/M/87 (May 29, 1973 mtg.) at 4.
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everyone. 61
After a three-month impasse, the procedural deadlock was
settled with an agreement to create a five-member panel to
hear the four complaints. 62 To keep the cases formally sepa-
rate, the panel would be treated as four separate panels, but all
four panels would have identical members, all four cases would
be heard at the same times, and all four panel reports would be
issued simultaneously. 63 The panel would have at least one but
not more than two tax experts.64
The result was a victory for the position that a complaining
party has a right to adjudication of its legal claims by a panel.
Yet the United States had also won its basic point by forging a
procedural link between the DISC complaint and the three
counterclaims. It had also won a small edge for its substantive
theory by obtaining agreement to the appointment of tax ex-
perts to the panel. Their appointment, a distinctive departure
from the normal GATT practice of appointing GATT delegates
from neutral countries, would tend to support the United
States view that the case turned on understanding the actual
operation and effects of the tax laws in issue.
Most GATT governments were disturbed by the United
States demands at this point in the proceedings. Although they
usually expressed disagreement with the substance of the de-
mands-the demand for linkage in particular-what primarily
concerned them was the United States's refusal to go forward
unless its various conditions were met. GATT adjudication pro-
cedures, like GATT decision making in general, are governed
by the practice of consensus decision making. The parties
themselves must agree to each step in the process-convening a
panel, the panel's composition, its terms of reference, and so
forth. Effective adjudication under these conditions requires
that governments act with restraint and with respect for the
other party's right to a legal ruling. In these early years follow-
ing the antilegalism of the 1960s, such restraint and respect had
not yet become very well established. The United States, for
example, was experiencing rather serious problems in getting
the European Community to go along with legal complaints6 5
61. Id.
62. GATT Doc. C/M/89 (July 30, 1973 mtg.) at 10-11.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. For example, the United States had waged an ultimately unsuccessful
campaign during 1969-1972 to obtain a legal ruling on certain of the Commu-
nity's preferential agreements with nonmembers. See R. HUDEC, supra note 2,
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The Treasury Department's list of nonnegotiable demands,
however, raised the problem to a new level of attention, per-
haps because it was now the United States abusing the process,
or perhaps because the effect was so dramatic this time. As the
DISC case dragged on for the next twelve years, roaming the
GATT agenda like a cursed sailing ship, each new failure would
remind governments of the high-handed demands that had
thrown the case off course in the beginning.
The GATT's response to this particular problem in the
DISC proceedings has been one of the better legacies of the
DISC case. Governments still retain the veto powers of consen-
sus decision making,66 but these veto powers are now subject to
a more effective consensus about what should and should not
be done in adjudication proceedings. The DISC case itself is
one of the focal points of that consensus; conduct reminiscent
of DISC-like tactics now brings a sharp and quick reaction. An-
other aspect of the consensus has been the emergence of stan-
dard ways of doing things, from standard procedures for
establishing a panel to standard terms-of-reference for panels
once they are appointed. The more a practice becomes stan-
dardized, the less room governments have, as a practical mat-
ter, to demand special and more favorable treatment. Finally,
the Contracting Parties have undertaken to describe their adju-
dication practices in a written text and have even adopted a few
new nonbinding procedural norms addressed to specific impedi-
ments in the process.67
at 232-33. The general problem had come to the attention of the United States
Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1973) ("Your com-
mittee is particularly concerned that the decisionmaking process in the GATT
is such as to make it impossible in practice for the United States to obtain a
determination with respect to certain practices... which appear to be clear
violations of the GATT.").
66. In 1982 the Contracting Parties gave serious consideration to a propo-
sal to remove the veto power of parties to the dispute. In the end, however,
the proposal, known as "consensus-minus-two," was defeated, and the old
practice was reaffirmed. See GA*TT, BISD, 29th Supp. at 16 (1983) ("The CoN-
TRACTING PARTIES reaffirmed that consensus will continue to be the tradi-
tional method of resolving disputes; however, they agreed that obstruction in
the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided." (text of 1982 Ministerial
Declaration pertaining to dispute-settlement procedures)).
67. The main document, adopted in the Tokyo Round negotiations, is the
1979 Understanding Regarding Notifction, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance, GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. at 210-18 (1980) [hereinafter 1979
Understanding]. The 1979 Understanding contains both an "Agreed Descrip-
tion of the Customary Practice of the GATT," and a set of nonbinding proce-
dural norms adopted with a view to improving the practice.
A companion reform to the 1979 Understanding was the adoption of sev-
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The power of this new consensus is quite formidable. Gov-
ernments still react to some GATT legal claims as outside the
realm of the possible, but in no recent case has a government
successfully opposed the appointment of a panel to hear such a
claim.
D. WAITING FOR A PANEL
GATT records contain no mention of the DISC case by
either party between the July 1973 Council decision to establish
the panel and November 1975 when the European Community
first complained of the delay.68 It was not until February of
1976 that the five members of the panel were actually ap-
pointed.6 9 The panel consisted of three diplomats from GATT
delegations in Geneva and two professors of public finance, one
from the London School of Economics and one from the Uni-
versity of Turin.70
The official explanation for the delay was the difficulty of
locating tax experts who understood the case, were acceptable
to the parties, and were willing to serve on the panel.71 Staff-
ing the panel was undoubtedly difficult, as is demonstrated by
the fact that the United States eventually had to settle for two
tax experts who were both European nationals. It is extremely
unlikely, however, that the search for panelists caused the full
eral separate dispute settlement procedures in the various Codes agreed to
during the Tokyo Round. The Code procedures varied in rigor, but most
tended to be more rigorous than the general dispute settlement procedures de-
scribed in the 1979 Understanding and have since served as a model toward
which all other GATT procedures gravitate. For a detailed description of the
Code procedures, see Hudec, supra note 4, at 171-77.
The first efforts to implement the Tokyo Round reforms were not very
successful, see infra note 184, and in response the Contracting Parties adopted
a further set of procedural norms in a 1982 Ministerial Declaration. GATT,
BISD, 29th Supp. at 13-16 (1983). These were followed by another reform in
1984 changing the process for selecting panelists. See infra note 76 and accom-
panying text. A precursor to all these written texts was a 1966 decision of the
Contracting Parties establishing a more rigorous procedure to deal with legal
complaints by developing countries. GATT, BISD, 14th Supp. at 18 (1966).
The most comprehensive and best informed step-by-step account of current
GATT panel procedures is Plank, supra note 4.
68. GATT Doc. C/M/110 (Nov. 21, 1975 mtg.) at 13; see also GATT Doc.
SR.31/2 (Nov. 26, 1975 mtg.) at 14.
69. See GATT Doc. C/M/112 (Feb. 17, 1976 mtg.) at 16.
70. GATT Doc. L/4422 (Nov. 12, 1976) at 1 (Chair informed Council of
panel's composition on Feb. 17, 1976), reprinted in GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. at
98 (1977).
71. GATT Doc. SR.32/1 (Nov. 26, 1975 mtg.) at 14 (statements by GATT
Director General and United States representative).
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two-and-a-half-year delay. There were long periods when the
Community did not appear very concerned about going for-
ward. One reason may have been the appearance of another ef-
fort in Washington to repeal the DISC. Congress actually did
legislate about DISC in 1975 and again in 1976, but the outcome
of both efforts was only to reduce the level of the tax bene-
fits.72 Another reason may have been the new round of GATT
trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round, that was taking shape
during these years.7 3 For most of 1974, its fate hung by a
thread while the United States Congress debated the necessary
negotiating authority. Pressing the attack on DISC while
United States trade legislation was pending would probably
have seemed like rather poor timing.7 4
Although these two political factors probably had more to
do with the delay than did the problem of finding panelists, the
DISC case is still remembered as a case in which esoteric de-
mands about the composition of a panel caused extraordinary
delay. As another highly visible lesson about the evils of abus-
ing the veto power, the remembered version has probably been
useful. As GATT law matures, however, continued repetition
of the lesson is beginning to do more harm than good.
The GATT at present has a serious problem of delay in
finding panelists, but it has nothing to do with specialists. The
problem is finding enough panelists of any kind, qualified and
acceptable to the parties, within a reasonable time. GATT dele-
gates from neutral countries were once the almost exclusive
source of panelists, but in an increasingly interdependent
world, the supply has dwindled as neutrality is less and less
easily assumed. At the same time, the volume of GATT litiga-
tion has increased rather remarkably.75 As a consequence,
72. Exports of certain scarce resources were excluded from DISC benefits
by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 603, 89 Stat. 26, 64. The
Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 13, limited DISC benefits to income from
increased exports.
73. The Tokyo Round, known also as the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(MTN), was opened formally by a Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo
on 14 September 1973, reprinted in GATT, BISD, 20th Supp. at 19 (1974).
74. The United States law was not finally enacted until early 1975. Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
75. Three comprehensive published lists of GATT legal complaints and
lawsuits are cited supra note 44. An accurate measure of the surge requires
using unpublished data that are more recent than published sources. Accord-
ing to the author's own count based on unpublished data, the following brief
profile may be given. In the 40-year period between 1948, when GATT began
operations, and the end of 1987, 165 GATT lawsuits have been filed, of which
105 were filed since 1970. The data for the cases since 1970 are:
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many legal complaints have had to endure long delays while
the GATT Secretariat has searched for qualified panelists who
are not already serving on another panel or chairing a major
GATT working body.
The GATT Secretariat has responded to this problem by
trying to broaden the pool, first by proposing retired Secretariat
officials as panelists, and more recently by creating a list of gov-
ernment-nominated candidates who are not government em-
ployees, such as retired government officials and academics.76
Similar lists of panelists have been assembled under most of
the Tokyo Round Codes, in some cases containing quite special-
ized experts on technical subjects such as government procure-
ment procedures. The Secretariat's pool of outsiders is not yet
an adequate solution to the basic problem, but the experience
has made the Secretariat far more capable in searching for pan-
elists of all kinds, including DISC-type specialists. These days,
specialists are no more difficult to find than any other panelist.
If specialists are needed to adjudicate certain types of claims
more effectively, there is no reason not to seek them out and
use them.77
Years Complaints Avg.!Year Panels Avg. Panels/Year
1970-1974 14* 2.8* 6* 1.2*
1975-1979 18 3.6 11 2.2
1980-1984 41 8.2 23 4.6
1985-1987 32 10.7 15** 5.0**
*(DISC counted as 4 complaints, 4 panels.)
**(1987 data not complete)
76. The Contracting Parties authorized assembling the list of nongovern-
mental panel nominees because the problem of delay in selecting panelists was
becoming critical. GATT, BISD, 31st Supp. at 9-10 (1985). The list was origi-
nally intended to act as a whip to make governments less demanding in chal-
lenging panelists. If the parties were unable to agree to a panel after 30 days,
the Director General was given authority, at the request of one party, to select
and appoint the missing panelist or panelists from the list. Id. at 10. Although
several cases have missed the 30-day deadline, to the author's knowledge no
government has yet requested that the whip be used. The Secretariat has
found the list of considerable utility, however, as a pool of available panelists.
In some 1987 panels, nongovernmental panelists were a majority, and in one
case the entire three-person panel consisted of outsiders.
77. Specialists can make important contributions. GATT dispute settle-
ment procedures do not give panelists many resources for information gather-
ing, nor much time to educate themselves. For a variety of institutional
reasons, government representation before panels is often not very helpful
either. When issues requiring specialized knowledge arise, GATT panels must
often rely in large measure on what the panelists bring to the problem.
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E. THE PANEL RULING ON DISC
The five-member panel was in place in February 1976. The
first hearing took place in mid-March, at which time the panel
heard from the parties and also from Canada speaking in sup-
port of the complaint against DISC. The panel met again in
late June to hear rebuttals and then held an in camera meeting
in late July. The panel completed its work by what it described
as a "postal procedure" and issued its four separate reports on
November 2, 1976.78
The panel's report on the DISC complaint arrived at a
carefully worded conclusion that "the DISC legislation in some
cases had effects which were not in accordance with the United
States' obligations under Article XVI:4." 79 From the moment
the report was issued, however, it was treated as a finding that
DISC as a whole would have to be changed. No one ever re-
quested a more precise definition of "some cases" or asked that
the remedy be limited to them. 0
Logically, the panel's conclusion hinged on two major is-
sues. The first issue was whether, standing alone, DISC was in-
consistent with the provisions of GATT Article XVI:4. This
issue involved the validity of the two technical defenses, defer-
ral and bilevel pricing, and the DISC report itself answered this
issue by finding that neither defense was valid."' The second is-
sue was whether the existence of similar tax subsidies in the
three European tax laws could somehow exonerate or other-
wise justify DISC. The second issue collapsed when the panel
ruled, in its other three reports, that the European tax laws
were also inconsistent with GATT Article XVI:4.8 2 The DISC
report itself never had to address the second issue, except to
78. GATT Docs. L/4422 (DISC), L/4423 (France), L/4424 (Belgium),
L/4425 (Netherlands) (1977). All four reports were issued simultaneously on
November 2, 1976. They are reprinted in GAIT, BISD, 23d Supp. at 98 (1977)
(DISC); id. at 114 (France); id. at 127 (Belgium); id. at 137 (Netherlands). Ci-
tation of the panel reports in this Article are to paragraph number and page
citations in the GA.2"1, BISD series.
79. GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. % 74, at 113 (1977) (emphasis added).
80. There was one moment, in the first Council meeting, when the dele-
gate of Argentina mentioned that the report "often referred only to some as-
pects" of the challenged laws and suggested that the panel's conclusions were
"not final." GATT Doc. C/M/117 (Nov. 12, 1976 mtg.) at 9 (quotation from
summary record). The delegate from Argentina never spoke in any of the sub-
sequent Council meetings. No other delegate ever mentioned the matter.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89, 96-127.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
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say that one violation did not justify the other.83 The substance
of the DISC report, therefore, was the panel's rejection of the
two technical defenses.
The panel's decision on each of the two technical defenses
has been criticized quite severely on the ground that the rea-
soning behind each finding was vague, incomplete, and in sev-
eral respects logically flawed.84 Although the shortcomings of
the panel's analysis are evident, closer examination shows that
these inadequacies were not the sort of failure they appeared to
be. The vague and impressionistic wording of the DISC rulings
was a decision-making technique that had been used in a sub-
stantial number of GATT panel decisions in the past, when it
had worked quite well. The issue presented by this aspect of
the DISC case is not so much whether the panel report itself
was well or poorly reasoned, but rather, first, how this impres-
sionistic technique of decision making actually worked, and sec-
ond, whether it remains an effective technique in the GATT
legal system of today.
1. The Deferral Defense
The most important issue with regard to DISC's gimmick
of merely deferring tax liability was not whether deferral of
tax liability was a subsidy, but how large a subsidy it was.
There was no doubt that deferral of taxes without interest rep-
resented a subsidy to the extent of the foregone interest. A
finding limited to the DISC's interest subsidy, however, would
have substantially understated its actual value. Firms were
treating deferral of taxes under DISC as though it were a com-
plete exemption from tax liability, based on their judgment
that deferral could in fact be extended in perpetuity, as the
original DISC law had promised.8 5 This greater actual value
made the difference between a minor technical violation and a
serious violation with major commercial impact.86
83. GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. 79, at 114 (1977).
84. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 4, at 764-72.
85. As things turned out, United States firms eventually concluded that
deferral was not exactly identical to an exemption. In 1984 most firms were
willing to pay a little something-supporting legislation that replaced DISC
with the slightly more onerous requirements of the Foreign Sales Corporation
(FSC) law-to wipe this deferred liability off their books entirely. See infra
notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
86. In terms of the household economics used in political debate, the dif-
ference would have been seen as the difference between an interest-free loan
of funds and an outright grant. In terms of first-year business economics, it
was the difference between a no-interest loan of uncertain duration and a no-
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Every interested GATT delegation probably recognized
that deferral was just a smokescreen and was prepared to treat
the DISC subsidy as tantamount to a full exemption. Whether
the panel had a sufficient basis for making a formal finding to
that effect was less clear. The United States insisted that the
DISC's contingent tax liability created a material risk that min-
imized the subsidy's impact, and a government's representa-
tions about the meaning of its own laws could not be casually
dismissed. Evidence for the contrary conclusion was not easy to
come by because the subsidy's actual value turned on a political
judgment about the likelihood that Congress would not change
the law.
According to GATT lore, GATT panels are supposed to be
good at this sort of practical judgment. Panelists are chosen
not for their legal expertise-they are often not lawyers-but
for their practical wisdom about real-world phenomena. The
reality is somewhat different, however. When confronted with
having to rule on the legality of another government's action,
even pragmatic people begin to worry about the juridical sound-
ness of what they are doing. Indeed, they probably worry more
than well-trained lawyers would, for diplomats and other
laypersons tend to have an exaggerated notion of the objective
foundation required for legal conclusions.
GATT panels had confronted this problem often in the
past, and they had typically taken a limited view of the kind of
decisions they could make stick on their own authority. The
caution was perhaps greatest in the early days of GATT, in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, when the legitimacy of the GATT it-
self was a touch-and-go thing in many capitals. In response to
these concerns, GATT panels and their Secretariat advisors had
developed a style of vague, almost impressionistic decision mak-
ing that merely suggested the adverse ruling, leaving it to sub-
sequent review and enforcement proceedings to make
something more out of it. 8 7 This artful style of decision making
had to some extent become institutionalized, in the form of a
vocabulary and syntax passed from one generation of panel
members and Secretariat staff to the next.
The DISC panel responded to its difficult evidentiary prob-
lem the way most GATT panels had in the past. It issued a re-
interest loan of perpetual duration, the latter being the functional equivalent
of a grant.
87. This phenomenon is explored at length in R. HUDEC, supra note 2,
particularly in several case studies at pages 99-190.
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port that was vague as to exactly what the subsidy was and how
large it was. The report said clearly that the foregone interest
was a subsidy,8 8 but did not say whether DISC's tax deferral in-
volved any other element of economic gain. The panel did add
some elliptical remarks suggesting that the effects of the unde-
fined subsidy were quite substantial and that these effects were
intended:
The Panel noted that the United States Treasury had acknowl-
edged that exports had increased as a result of the DISC legislation
and the Panel considered that the fact that so many DISCs had been
created was evidence that DISC status conferred a substantial benefit.
... The panel noted that the DISC legislation was intended, in its
own terms, to increase United States exports .... 89
That was all it said. The panel never stated clearly what con-
clusion it had drawn about the nature or the size of the subsidy,
much less why.
Evasive decisions of this kind can certainly be criticized as
poor legal craftsmanship. Oddly enough, however, the GATT
experience up to the DISC case had been that such decisions
worked rather well. They worked because the GATT member
governments, to whom such decisions were addressed, usually
knew or thought they knew the answer anyway. Governments
would supply the missing parts of the conclusion in the review-
ing process that followed, by treating the decision as though it
had said clearly what in fact it had only implied. This tech-
nique worked particularly well during the first decade of
GATT's existence, when the membership was small and cohe-
sive and when most governments were still represented by del-
egates who had participated in drafting the General
Agreement. 90
By the time of the DISC decision in 1976, the GATT was
beginning to outgrow this ultracautious style of decision mak-
ing. The need for caution had diminished, because most na-
tional governments had come to accept GATT and its law as a
necessary part of the international order. The GATT's ability
to work with cautious decisions had also declined, because the
GATT's membership was no longer a small group of like-
88. GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. 1 72, at 113 (1977).
89. Id. §§ 68-69, at 112. According to a subsequent European Community
statement, as of September 1976, some 9090 DISCs had been created, approxi-
mately 75% of United States exports in fiscal 1976 had been channelled
through DISCs, and United States estimates indicated that DISC had in-
creased exports by $8 billion. GATT Doc. C/M/119 (Mar. 2, 1977 mtg.) at 12-
13.
90. See R. HUDEC, supra note 2, at 99-190.
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minded insiders. As was just seen, however, the DISC panel'
chose to follow the old impressionistic style of decision making
anyway. Surprisingly enough, it still worked. The GATT mem-
bership did not need to be told explictly that DISC's deferral
arrangement was a sham, and the United States had enough
sense not to argue against that consensus once the panel had
ruled. The panel's few remarks indicating the necessary con-
clusion, inadequate though they were, said enough to remove
the deferral defense from further consideration.
The more important question raised by this part of the
DISC case is whether the impressionistic technique is still a
valid and effective form of legal decision making at the present
time. There is good reason to believe it is not. In the twelve
years since the DISC decision, the issues of trade policy con-
fronting the GATT have continued to grow more complex and
more difficult. Although the GATT has managed to work out
agreements dealing with many of the new issues, the present
consensus on substantive matters is less solid than it was
before, and the likelihood of resistance to legal rulings has
risen accordingly. Effective consensus is still attainable in most
cases, but it does not occur as easily or as spontaneously as it
once did. In this more contentious environment, governments
are more likely to take advantage of the gaps and the vagueness
in impressionistic legal rulings, resisting adverse rulings by in-
sisting on the letter of what is not said. This has already hap-
pened in a few recent cases.91
Another factor that has undercut the effectiveness of the
traditional technique has been the greater attention now being
paid to GATT's adjudication procedures. The past twelve years
have witnessed an explosion in GATT litigation,92 and the ef-
fectiveness of that litigation has now become an important
measuring rod of GATT's overall credibility. To defend
GATT's credibility, governments have made repeated commit-
ments during the past decade pledging to make GATT adjudica-
91. The clearest example was a pair of complaints brought by Australia
and Brazil against the European Community's export subsidy on sugar. Both
decisions are titled European Community: Refunds on Exports of Sugar and
appear respectively in GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. at 290 (1980), and GATT,
BISD, 27th Supp. at 69 (1981) [hereinafter Sugar decisions]. The cases are de-
scribed in Phegan, GATT Article XVL3: Export Subsidies and "Equitable
Shares," 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 251 (1982); Note, European Community Resist-
ance to the Enforcement of GATT Panel Decisions on Sugar Export Subsidies,
15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 397 (1982).
92. See data reported supra note 75.
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tion work better.93 Under the spotlight of all this attention,
impressionistic legal rulings have begun to look like legal
failures-a tribunal unable to rule as effectively as govern-
ments have been promising. The GATT Contracting Parties re-
cently reacted against such ambiguous decisions by adopting a
new procedural norm expressly directing future GATT panels
to make clearer rulings.9 4
The importance of this change in GATT decision-making
practice should not be exaggerated. Clearer and better rea-
soned legal decisions will not by themselves overcome opposi-
tion to an adverse legal ruling. The final outcome of GATT
litigation still depends on the force of the consensus behind the
ruling in question. The point is merely that GATT legal affairs
have reached a stage at which clearer legal decisions are ex-
pected and are actually needed to build and maintain whatever
consensus is possible. In this changed environment, the old im-
pressionistic technique would most likely have the opposite ef-
fect of weakening consensus.9 5 If the DISC case were to be
decided by a present-day GATT panel, a much clearer decision
would have to be written.
93. The recent GATT decisions seeking to improve the functioning of the
dispute settlement procedure are described supra notes 67 and 76.
94. GATT, BISD, 29th Supp. v, at 14 (1983) ("The terms of reference of
a panel should be formulated so as to permit a clear finding with respect to
any contravention of GATT provisions and/or on the question of nullification
and impairment of benefits."). The new procedural norm was adopted in reac-
tion to several panel decisions that had seemed to avoid clear answers, includ-
ing the two Sugar decisions cited supra note 91. It was given additional
emphasis after a 1983 panel report failed to reach a conclusion regarding a
Subsidies Code complaint by the United States against European Community
export subsidies on wheat flour. See European Community: Subsidies on Ex-
port of Wheat Flour, reprinted in GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Com-
plaint Concerning EC Subsidies to Wheat Farmers, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. U.S.
Export Weekly (BNA) No. 20, at 899 (Mar. 8, 1983). On the follow-up see
GATT, BISD, 33d Supp. 16, at 201 (1987).
95. In a 1980 article, the author took the position that the old impression-
istic technique could play a useful role by avoiding the head-on collisions in-
vited by "wrong cases"-lawsuits making legal demands that cannot be met
politically. Hudec, supra note 4, at 189-92. Viewing the issue again in the light
of the developments in GATT adjudication over the past eight years, the au-
thor would not make the same judgement about a wrong case brought in the
present-day GATT. A clear decision may still produce an undesirable collision
between GATT law and an immovable policy, but the harm that an evasive de-
cision would do to the respect for GATT adjudication would be as great. The
more good decisions are made, the more harm inadequate decisions will do.
For a recent work that reaches a similar conclusion, see Davey, supra note 4.
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2. The Bilevel Pricing Defense
The issue of bilevel pricing presented the panel with an
even more difficult decision-making problem-an express legal
requirement that appeared impossible to satisfy literally, but
which most GATT members considered to be wrong in the first
place. The panel resolved this issue in the same way it resolved
the deferral issue. It issued a report containing a few vague
paragraphs suggesting that the bilevel pricing requirement had
probably been satisfied in some cases and that DISC had there-
fore violated GATT Article XVI:4 "in some cases."' 96 Once
again, the answer worked. The panel had again said enough for
the underlying consensus to attach, and from the moment it
was issued, the panel report was treated as a clear ruling that
the bilevel pricing requirement had been satisfied.97
The panel's decision on the bilevel pricing issue offers a
particularly striking example of the power of consensus in
GATT adjudication-the power that ultimately supplies the
force behind legal decision making in GATT. Because the legal
text stating the bilevel pricing requirement was so clear, there
had to be a particularly strong consensus in opposition to the
requirement to sustain a decision setting it aside. There was.
The effect of this consensus was perhaps the most fascinating
legal phenomenon of this entire twelve-year odyssey.
The consensus itself was not difficult to understand. The
bilevel pricing requirement simply made no sense as a matter
of policy. As pointed out earlier,98 export subsidies are equally
harmful whether they induce lower prices or merely stimulate
greater volumes at existing prices, and the latter effect is more
common. The key to the puzzle was to understand why the
bilevel pricing requirement had become part of the GATT legal
text in the first place and how it happened that text and policy
ended up in conflict. The story is rather unusual.
GATT Article XVI:4 was not part of the original GATT
agreement of October 1947. The text had been drafted in 1946-
1948, as Article 26(1) of the Charter of the International Trade
Organization (ITO).99 Although the 1947 GATT agreement had
96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 80.
98. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
99. The text of ITO Charter Article 26(1) read:
No Member shall grant, directly or indirectly, any subsidy on the ex-
port of any product, or establish or maintain any other system, which
subsidy or system results in the sale of such product for export at a
price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to
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incorporated most of the ITO Charter's commercial policy pro-
visions,100 Article 26(1) had been omitted from GATT due to its
more controversial character. 10 ' After the ITO Charter failed
to be ratified,10 2 the GATT convened a special Review Session
in 1954-1955 to consider what changes were needed to enable
GATT to assume the ITO's role. The Review Session concluded
that GATT would need to regulate export subsidies. 0 3 Almost
automatically, governments had turned to ITO Article 26(1) as
an established legal text suitable for this purpose' °4 and added
it to the General Agreement as Article XVI:4.10 5
The bilevel pricing requirement in ITO Article 26(1) had
buyers in the domestic market, due allowance being made for [differ-
ent conditions of sale etc.].
The ITO Charter's formal title was Charter for an International Trade Or-
ganization, although in some printings it is titled Havana (or Habana) Charter
for an International Trade Organization. "Havana Charter" is another com-
mon shorthand title. The official text is contained in U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78
(Mar. 24, 1948), reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948), and in U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PuB. No. 3206, COMMERCIAL PoUCY SERIES No. 114 (1948). A widely
cited British government publication is Cmd 7375 (1957), available from H.M.
Stationery Office, York House, Kingsway, London. On the drafting of the
Charter, see W. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF
WORLD TRADE: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE ITO CHARTER AND THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (1950); C. WILcox, A CHARTER
FOR WORLD TRADE (1949).
100. The GATT agreement used the standing ITO texts because it was, in
effect, an advance installment of the ITO Charter, a provisional trade agree-
ment that was supposed to be absorbed into the ITO after the ITO came into
force. See GATT Article XXIX.
101. ITO Article 26(1) was controversial because it was both new to trade
agreement practice and required terminating a great deal of existing subsidy
practice. The United States was the principal opponent of including Article 26
in GATT, arguing that it would not accept the discipline of Article 26 without
the full implementation of the ITO Charter as a quid pro quo. For the United
States's position, see GATT Docs. GATT/CP.2/SR.5 (Aug. 19, 1948 AM mtg) at
4-5; GATT/CP.2/SR.6 (Aug. 19, 1948 PM mtg) at 4. For the decision of Con-
tracting Parties, see GATT, BISD, Vol. 2 (1952) 39, at 43 (text of GATT Doc.
GATT/CP.2/22/Rev.1 (Aug. 30, 1948)).
102. The ITO failed because the United States Congress was unwilling to
ratify it during 1949 and 1950. President Truman withdrew it from considera-
tion in December of 1950. Without United States participation, the ITO would
have been meaningless. See DIEBOLD, THE END OF THE ITO (Princeton Essays
in International Finance No. 16, 1952).
103. For the report explaining the amendments to Article XVI decided
upon, see GATT, BISD, 3d Supp. at 226-27 (1955).
104. Virtually every government proposal for the new export subsidies pro-
vision used the language of ITO Article 26(1). See, e.g., GATT Docs. L/264
(Oct. 28, 1954) (South Africa); L/273 (Nov. 9, 1954) (Denmark).
105. Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Mar. 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1767, T.I.A.S.
No. 3930, 278 U.N.T.S. 168.
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received little attention during the 1946-1948 ITO negotiations.
It first appeared in the United States proposals which opened
the negotiations and remained essentially unchanged from then
on.10 6 The most likely reason for its easy acceptance was polit-
ical rather than economic. The evidence indicates that the ITO
Charter drafters fully understood that export subsidies could
be economically harmful whether or not they caused lower ex-
port prices.10 7 Politically, however, the prohibition of export
subsidies, even though it applied only to industrial exports and
not agricultural exports, was a new and controversial idea in
trade agreements. In all probability, therefore, the bilevel pric-
ing requirement was understood to be a tactical concession, a
way of limiting this disturbing new idea to cases in which the
distorting effects of export subsidies were most visible. Con-
ceivably, the purpose could even have been polite sabotage.
The original text that introduced the bilevel pricing rule was
drafted by the United States, the country chiefly responsible
for blocking incorporation of ITO Article 26 into the 1947
GATT. 08 It is at least possible that the United States had
lacked enthusiasm for the antisubsidy rule from the beginning
and had inserted the bilevel pricing requirement as a way of
eviscerating it.
The 1954-1955 Review Session drafters who reintroduced
ITO Article 26(1) gave no indication that they appreciated the
restrictive nature of the bilevel pricing requirement. 10 9 To the
contrary, virtually every reference to the new GATT Article
XVI:4 indicated an assumption that the text prohibited all ex-
106. The texts, cited in chronological order, were: U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. No. 2411, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES No. 79, PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDER-
ATION BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT Ch.
III, § D:2 (1945) (first text to state bilevel pricing rule); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. No. 2598, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES No. 93, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Art. 25:2
(1946) ("Suggested Charter"); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2728, COMMER-
CIAL POLICY SERIES No. 98, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CHARTER FOR THE INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Art. 30(2) (1946)
("London Draft"); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2927, COMMERCIAL POLICY
SERIES No. 106, DRAFT CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Art. 26(1) (1947) ("Geneva Draft").
107. They would have certainly known this as a simple matter of common
sense, but this knowledge is also reflected in Charter provisions. ITO Charter
Article 25, for example, made it clear that the important characteristic of sub-
sidies, including export subsidies, was their effect on volume of trade. The ef-
fect on volume is the only effect that ITO Article 25 requires to be reported.
108. See supra note 101.
109. The difficulty of meeting the bilevel pricing requirement is described
supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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port subsidies on industrial goods, completely and without qual-
ification. In the closing plenary meeting, for example, one
delegate after another referred to Article XVI:4 as a "ban on
subsidies of manufactured goods,"110 or a "total abolition of in-
dustrial [export] subsidies,""'1 or concluded that "subsidization
of the export of industrial goods was prohibited".1 2
The same absolutist understanding of GATT Article XVI:4
was manifest in 1960 when, after a five-year delay, most devel-
oped-country governments finally agreed to put Article XVI:4
into effect as a binding obligation.1 3 At this time, the French
government proposed that governments adopt an illustrative
list of practices deemed to be export subsidies under Article
XVI:4. The French delegation described the list as "a certain
number of practices which would be prohibited under para-
graph 4 of Article XVI. 11 4 The working party report approv-
ing the illustrative list likewise spoke as though the
enumerated practices were prohibited without qualification." 5
This curious tendency to ignore the bilevel pricing require-
ment can be traced to a change in government policy toward
export subsidies. By 1955 most governments had overcome
their initial caution about prohibiting export subsidies on indus-
trial products and were now prepared to accept absolute prohi-
bition. In fact, they had already done so in another forum.
Most of the governments that would sign GATT Article XVI:4
were also members or participants in the Organization for Eu-
ropean Economic Cooperation (OEEC)-the institution set up
to coordinate the postwar economic reconstruction of Western
Europe and to administer the Marshall Plan.116 In 1955, at the
same time they were adopting the text of Article XVI:4 in
GATT, these governments were also adopting a Decision of the
110. GATT Doc. SR.9/41 (Mar. 3, 1955 mtg.) at 3 (delegate of Australia).
111. Id. at 7 (delegate of France).
112. Id. at 4 (delegate of Denmark). In 1988 a member of the United States
delegation to the Review Session, commenting on a draft of this Article, said
he could recall no discussion of bilevel pricing, within the United States dele-
gation or elsewhere.
113. The 1955 amendment had added the text to the General Agreement,
but had postponed giving it full legal effect. The convoluted history of bring-
ing GATT Article XVI:4 into force is described in J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at
372-74.
114. GATT Doc. L/1260 (Aug. 1, 1960) at 2; see also SR.17/3 (Nov. 4, 1960
mtg.) at 18 (delegate of France).
115. GATT, BISD, 9th Supp. at 186-87 (1961) (text of 1960 working party
report and illustrative list, as adopted by Contracting Parties).
116. For a description of the origins and work program of the OEEC, see A
DECADE OF COOPERATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (1958) (9th Re-
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OEEC Council obliging OEEC members to cease export subsi-
dies on industrial products by the end of the following year.117
The OEEC obligation was absolute, containing no bilevel pric-
ing requirement.
Despite its different language, Article XVI:4 seems to have
been viewed as merely a repetition of the absolute OEEC obli-
gation. GATT governments continued to treat the two subsidy
obligations in parallel throughout the late 1950s. The OEEC's
export subsidy obligation was not put into force until 1959 and
1960, the same time GATT Article XVI:4 became a legal obliga-
tion.118 Moreover, the illustrative list adopted by GATT in 1960
was a verbatim copy of a list attached to the 1960 OEEC obliga-
tion119 and was adopted explicitly for the purpose of ensuring
that GATT obligations on export subsidies would be exactly the
same as OEEC obligations.120
The available documents do not make clear to what extent
this convoluted negotiating history was known or put before
the panel. Even with the full story before them, of course, the
panel members would have found it impossible to strike the
bilevel pricing requirement from Article XVI:4 simply on the
ground that the drafters had not really meant to put it there.
The panel needed a legally plausible theory for saying that the
Contracting Parties had actually legislated their true purpose.
The European Community offered a legal theory that dis-
port of the OEEC). The United States and Canada were not formal members
of OEEC but participated in all OEEC work as "associated countries."
In late 1960 the OEEC was replaced by a more comprehensive organiza-
tion called the OECD, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, which today
includes virtually every GATT developed country.
117. Decision of the Council of 14th January 1955 Concerning Measures
Designed to Aid Exporters, OEEC Doc. C(55)6, cited in OEEC Doc. C(60)130,
published in OEEC, CODE OF LIBERALISATION 193 (July 1960).
118. Decision of the Council Concerning Measures Designed to Aid Ex-
ports, OEEC DOC. C(60)130, June 24, 1960, amending decision C(59)202, pub-
lished in OEEC, CODE OF LiBERAUSATION, supra note 117.
119. The French proposal identifies the text of the proposed illustrative list
as having been taken from the annex to OEEC Document C(59)202. GATT
Doc. L/1260 (Aug. 1, 1960) at 2.
120. GATT Doc. SR.17/3 (Nov. 4, 1960 mtg.). OEEC documents shed fur-
ther light on the purpose for this harmonization. In 1960 the OEEC was about
to be replaced by the OECD, which did not intend to continue the trade policy
obligations of OEEC. In mid-1960 the OEEC extended its own export subsidy
prohibition for another six months to give time for the GATT to adopt it, and
later extended the prohibition to the date when the GATT declaration came
into force. See OEEC, TWELFT ANNUAL ECONoMic REVIEW 35-36 (1961).
GATT Article XVI:4 was, in short, meant to serve as a replacement for the
OEEC obligation.
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covered such a legislative act in the 1960 GATT decision adopt-
ing the OEEC's interpretative list. Even though the
interpretative list was, by its terms, merely an enumeration of
certain practices that were to be considered export subsidies,
the GATT decision approving the list treated the listed prac-
tices as though they had been prohibited absolutely. It was pos-
sible, argued the Community, to read the prohibitory tenor of
the 1960 decision as a separate GATT decision-a decision actu-
ally prohibiting the enumerated practices in all cases. The 1960
decision could be viewed as a finding that subsidy practices enu-
merated on the list satisfied the two-price rule, or at least could
be "presumed" to do so. There was not the slightest evidence,
of course, that anyone in 1960 was actually thinking about the
price effects of these practices. Nevertheless, since the dele-
gates clearly did believe they were effecting an unqualified
legal prohibition of these practices, it was not really inaccurate
to ascribe to them the predicate thought needed to reach that
conclusion. 121
Applying this theory, the Community presented the panel
with a legal analysis showing that DISC violated Article XVI:4:
DISC's tax deferral was equivalent to either an "exemption" or
a "remission" of income taxes, practices that were listed in
items (c) and (d) of the 1960 illustrative list; consequently,
DISC could also be presumed to result in bilevel pricing.12
In reply, the United States took an interesting tactical gam-
ble. The strongest defense of DISC would have been to reject
the Community's theory altogether and to insist that bilevel
pricing had to be proved with specific evidence in every case.
That position, however, would have doomed the United States
counterclaims against the three European tax laws, for the
United States had no better hope of actually proving bilevel
121. The Community's theory is outlined in the DISC panel report. See
GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. 51, at 109 (1977).
In United States jurisprudence, it is sometimes within the province of
courts to supply a predicate thought needed to arrive at a conclusion believed
to have been intended. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892) (whether immigration law prohibiting entry of workers under
contract covers British clergyman hired by contract to serve as minister of
Wall Street Episcopal church).
122. GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. q 51, at 109 (1977) (DISC report). The Com-
munity went on to submit a variety of other proofs and arguments to show
that the two-price requirement was satisfied, claiming that the burden was on
the United States to prove the contrary, that United States businesses had af-
firmed in testimony before Congress that DISC had lowered their prices, and
that the price effects could be shown by theoretical calculations. See id. 52-
55, at 109-10.
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pricing in any of those cases. The United States was not pre-
pared to surrender the counterclaims this easily. Instead, the
United States chose to gamble by accepting the Community's
presumption theory, with a clever twist. In the words of the
panel report,
The representative of the United States accepted that those tax prac-
tices which clearly fell within the 1960 illustrative list [that is, the
"exemptions" from tax in the three European tax laws] did carry the
presumption of bilevel pricing but that practices not in the list, in-
cluding tax deferral [DISC], did not carry that presumption.123
The gamble did not pay off. The panel accepted the theory
endorsed by both parties-that the 1960 illustrative list meant
to create a presumption of bilevel pricing for the practices enu-
merated-but it declined to accept the United States argument
that deferral was not on the list. It found that interest-free
deferral of tax liability involved an "exemption" from taxation,
at least to the extent of the interest foregone. Thus, DISC was
subject to the presumption of bilevel pricing. 2 4 In effect, the
United States had just gambled away its best defense.
At this point, the panel's nerve faltered, and it retreated to
a more complex conclusion. In an apparent effort to avoid rest-
ing the decision on the presumption theory alone, the panel an-
nounced that the presumption was not meant to be absolute 2 5
and that the panel had to examine evidence of whether bilevel
123. Id. S 56, at 110. It appears the United States began to have second
thoughts about this gamble very soon after making the concession. In the
DISC case, the United States tried to prove that no bilevel pricing had oc-
curred by arguing that subsidies seldom affect export prices because export
prices are usually set by the market. Id. % 57, at 110. It also argued that, ac-
cording to GATT legal principles, income tax rates should have no effect on
prices at all. Id. 58, at 110. The legal principle in question was the theory
that indirect taxes-for example, a sales or value-added tax on the product-
have the effect of raising prices, whereas direct taxes such as income taxes
have no price effect and therefore cannot be adjusted for at the border without
creating a distortion. Cf. GATT Arts. H:2(a), VI:4; Ad Art. VI. This part of the
United States's argument was virtually a brief for a counterpresumption that
income tax subsidies would never lead to bilevel pricing.
Then, when arguing the three counterclaims, the United States backed
away from endorsing the presumption itself. It took the position that if the
panel report on the DISC complaint adopted the presumption of bilevel pric-
ing, and if the DISC report decided that DISC fit within the presumption, then
the panel would have to find the same bilevel pricing presumption with regard
to each of the three European systems. See GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. 43, at
124 (1977) (France); id. 4 30, at 134 (Belgium); id. % 31, at 144 (Netherlands).
In the end the United States seemed to occupy all three possible positions on
the presumption of bilevel pricing-yes, no, and '"you decide."
124. GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. 4I 71-72, at 113 (1977).
125. Id. % 72, at 113.
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pricing had actually occurred. The report then suggested, in
extremely general terms, a finding that bilevel pricing had
occurred:
The Panel considered that, from an economic point of view, there
was a presumption that an export subsidy would lead to any or a com-
bination of the following consequences in the export sector: (a) low-
ering of prices, (b) increase of sales effort and (c) increase of profits
per unit. Because the subsidy was both significant and broadly based
it was to be expected that all of these effects would occur and that, if
one occurred, the other two would not necessarily be excluded. A
concentration of the subsidy benefits on prices could lead to substan-
tial reductions in prices. The Panel did not accept that a reduction in
prices in export markets needed automatically to be accompanied by
similar reductions in domestic markets. These conclusions were sup-
ported by statements by American personalities and companies and
the Panel felt that it should pay some regard to this evidence.
12 6
It was the tenuous quality of this analysis that forced the panel
to limit its conclusion to the rather feeble finding that "the
DISC legislation in some cases had effects which were not in
accordance with the United States' obligations under Article
XVI:4."1
As noted earlier,128 the panel ruling, flimsy as it was,
worked. Indeed, the fact that it was so flimsy makes the power
of the underlying consensus all the more impressive. Had it
wanted to, the United States could have demolished the panel's
finding on bilevel pricing.129 Yet, despite its quite vigorous
resistance to accepting the panel's findings over the next six
years, the United States never once criticized that finding.
The United States's conduct on the bilevel pricing issue de-
serves further consideration. It is .possible that the tactical
gamble taken by the United States contained an element of
willing surrender. It stands to reason that the United States, or
at least some part of its policy-making establishment, also
wanted the bilevel pricing requirement ruled out of play. A
rigorous bilevel pricing requirement was not really consistent
with long-term United States policy objectives. At the time the
126. Id. 73, at 113. The reference to American personalities and compa-
nies referred to testimony before Congressional committees avowing that
DISC had permitted reduction of export prices. Id. 1 55, at 109-10. One could
legitimately question whether the credibility of witnesses arguing to preserve
a tax benefit is high enough to permit their testimony to be used as evidence
in an international proceeding.
127. Id. q 74, at 113.
128. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
129. Professor Jackson's criticism of the logic gives a good account of what
the United States could have argued. Jackson, supra note 4, at 768-71.
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DISC case was being argued, the United States was setting out
to lead the GATT's Tokyo Round negotiations toward adoption
of a new Subsidies Code that would strengthen the legal prohi-
bition against export subsidies. A rigorous bilevel pricing re-
quirement would have had exactly the opposite effect. While
this hypothesis cannot be proved, it deserves to be noted. The
power of consensus works in many ways, including from
within.
3. The Outcome
The eventual outcome of the DISC panel report needs to
be stated briefly here, with a more detailed autopsy to follow.
The United States stated that it was willing to accept the
panel's ruling that DISC violated GATT Article XVI:4, pro-
vided that the other three panel reports finding the French,
Belgian, and Netherlands tax systems also GATT-illegal were
accepted at the same time.130 The United States held this posi-
tion, off and on, for five years. Finally, in December of 1981,
the United States agreed to accept all four reports subject to an
"understanding" that overruled the findings against the three
European tax laws by stating that territorial tax laws were con-
sistent with Article XVI:4.13 1
The 1981 understanding did not exonerate DISC, but it
narrowed the finding of violation to the difference between
DISC and the territorial principle-the domestic character of
the DISC tax haven. In the end the United States complied
with the GATT ruling by merely restructuring- the DISC to
eliminate this difference. A new law was passed in 1984 creat-
ing a new tax-haven corporation, called the Foreign Sales Cor-
poration (FSC), which provided substantially the same tax
benefits as DISC except that, to comply with the territoriality
principle, it required taxpayers to run export sales through a
foreign-based sales corporation.1 32 Despite considerable grum-
bling about whether FSC's foreign characteristics were foreign
enough to satisfy the territoriality principle, no government
filed a GATT legal complaint challenging the new FSC law.
In sum, therefore, the practical significance of the DISC
ruling was eventually limited by the way that GATT finally
130. GATT Doc. C/M/122 (July 26, 1977 mtg.) at 9-10.
131. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
132. A basic outline of the law creating FSC (pronounced "fisc") is pro-
vided infra notes 189-200.
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ruled in the other three cases. We now turn to that half of the
DISC litigation.
F. THE PANEL RULING ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS
The panel wrote three virtually identical reports concern-
ing the United States counterclaims against the tax laws of
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 33 In each case the
panel ruled that tax advantages made possible by not taxing
foreign-earned income under the territoriality principle were
an export subsidy, and found, in the same words used in the
DISC report, that the subsidy "in some cases had effects which
were not in accordance with [the defendant's] obligations under
Article XVI:4."'1
Given that the three European defendants had chosen not
to assert the bilevel pricing defense,135 the only real issue in the
three counterclaims was whether the failure to tax foreign
earnings was an export subsidy in the first place. The key to
the panel's finding on this point was its decision to treat the
two parts of the tax-haven transaction-the exporter's initial
export to its foreign alter ego and the alter ego's resale to the
ultimate buyer-as a single export transaction. The panel
stated this conclusion elliptically by referring to the sale-resale
process as an "economic process originating in the country." 136
133. GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. at 114 (1977) (France); id. at 127 (Belgium);
id. at 137 (Netherlands).
134. Id. % 53, at 126 (France); id. 40, at 136 (Belgium); id. 40, at 146
(Netherlands).
The panel also agreed with the United States argument that tax laws that
permit shifting of domestic-source income abroad by sales at less than arm's
length prices would constitute an additional tax subsidy, see id. T 54, at 126
(France); id. 41, at 136 (Belgium); id. % 41, at 146 (Netherlands), but it made
no findings as to whether the French, Belgian, or Netherlands tax laws actu-
ally permitted such transfer pricing, and so made no finding of violation on
this second claim.
135. The European Community's argument in the DISC case that the 1960
illustrative list created a conclusive presumption of bilevel pricing, see supra
text accompanying notes 121-24, logically extended to the type of tax exemp-
tion at issue in the three counterclaims. By not raising a bilevel pricing de-
fense, the three individual defendants were accepting this position.
136. GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. 1 47, at 125 (France); id. 34, at 135
(Belgium); id. 34, at 145 (Netherlands) (emphasis added). The full statement
of the panel report is as follows:
The panel noted that the particular application of the [territoriality
principle by the defendant country] allowed some part of export activ-
ities, belonging to an economic process originating in the country, to
be outside the scope of [its] taxes. In this way [the defendant] had for-
gone revenue from this source and created a possibility of a pecuniary
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The implication was that what went on outside the country-
the resale-was also part of the same "process." By not taxing
the income from the second sale, therefore, governments were
granting a tax exemption to the exporting process.
The Contracting Parties never accepted the three findings
of a GATT Article XVI:4 violation. The three defendants, with
broad support from other governments, refused to approve the
reports and proposed they be set aside by the GATT Council.
For five years the United States blocked every such effort, but
then finally relented in 1981. The panel decisions were dis-
posed of by a Council decision which, while accepting the three
reports in form, added an understanding which overruled their
main legal finding. 37 The three cases then disappeared from
the GATT agenda.
The three unaccepted legal rulings are the most prominent
failures of the DISC litigation. The blame is usually attached
to the panel itself, and to some extent its Secretariat advisors,
for issuing a ruling that virtually no government would sup-
port. It is worth looking carefully at the nature of the legal is-
sue to see what caused this to happen.
The United States argument that tax advantages under the
territoriality principle were an export subsidy rested on their
economic effects.' 38 The United States insisted that those tax
savings had the same economic effect as any other export sub-
sidy, equal to or greater than the economic effects of the tax
savings under DISC.' 39 The economic analysis underlying this
argument was difficult to refute. Everyone in the tax business
knew that a territorial tax system could be used to make the
taxation of export operations significantly lower than the taxa-
tion of identical domestic operations. It was also clear that
those tax savings would induce a greater allocation of resources
to exporting than would otherwise be the case. Even if this
were not the purpose of the territoriality principle, it was de-
monstrably its effect.
Although the European defendants offered a number of
conclusory arguments denying both the intent to subsidize and
benefit to exports in those cases where income and corporation tax
provisions were significantly more liberal in foreign countries.
137. See infra text accompanying note 172.
138. The full United States argument is summarized in each of the three
panel reports. For the key points in this economic analysis, see, for example,
paragraphs 18, 19, and 33 of the report on France, GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. at
117-18, 122 (1977).
139. Id-
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the occurrence of any harmful economic effects, they never
made a serious effort to dispute the United States's economic
argument as such.1 40 Their only real answer to the United
States position was that governments had clearly intended
GATT Article XVI:4 to permit territorial tax systems and that
economic effects just did not matter in the face of such clear in-
tent. They based their argument primarily on the longstanding
and widespread acceptance of the territoriality principle in
world tax circles.1 41 The principle had already been well estab-
lished when GATT adopted Article XVI:4 in 1955, and many
GATT members, including the three defendants, had already
been employing that principle for decades. It was simply im-
possible to believe, the European defendants argued, that
GATT Article XVI:4 had meant to impose requirements that
would have revolutionized world tax practice.14 2 There was not
the slightest evidence that any signatory government even re-
motely envisioned such consequences.
In retrospect, both arguments were correct. The govern-
ments that adopted Article XVI:4 did not intend to force major
changes in world income tax laws. By the same token, how-
ever, their decision not to disturb the territoriality principle
left a large loophole in what was supposed to be a legal obliga-
tion prohibiting export subsidies.
The loophole made interpretation of Article XVI:4 quite
difficult. Given the territoriality exception, it was not possible
to read Article XVI:4 as expressing a straightforward policy
against export subsidies. Moreover, since the exception for ter-
ritorial tax systems was a matter of historical accident rather
than policy, there was no economic policy explanation of why
the line was drawn there rather than somewhere else. In other
words, there was no ready answer to the repeated United
States question, "If territoriality, why not DISC?"
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that
140. Each of the three reports contains a fair amount of rhetorical argu-
ment insisting that the respective systems are not assisting exports, see, e.g.,
GATT, BISD, 23d Supp. 20, at 118 (1977) (France), but none of the defend-
ants denied the tax differential, and none refuted its anticipated economic ef-
fects. The Netherlands government actually agreed that special benefits were
possible and tried to make this into a virtue by arguing that the territoriality
system had the advantage of not interfering with the efforts of developing
countries to attract foreign businesses by offering lower tax rates. Id. 19, at
141.
141. See, e.g., id. 21, at 131 (Belgium).
142. See id. 20, at 118 (France); id. 21, at 131 (Belgium); id. I 21, at 141
(Netherlands).
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GATT was willing, after years of conflict, to accept a rule that
did draw a line between territoriality and DISC. Although the
line is arbitrary in economic terms, there is a legal policy ra-
tionale that explains what GATT did. The GATT had no choice
but to accept territorial tax systems, for governments simply
would not agree to change them. Being forced to start from
this position, GATT still had an interest in keeping the scope of
that concession as narrow as possible, simply to keep the vol-
ume of trade-distorting export subsidies as low as possible. Re-
quiring that only foreign tax havens be employed may have
been arbitrary in economic terms, but it did serve the policy of
limiting the subsidy, simply by making it more difficult for ex-
porters to earn it. DISC was over the line because it allowed
exporters to obtain subsidies more easily.
Should the DISC panel have been expected to make such a
ruling? Current GATT opinion would not demand that panels
make such rulings simply to conform to the political climate at
the time. As presently viewed, GATT panels are expected to
give an objective opinion of the law and the facts, even if they
know that governments will reject such rulings. If the majority
of GATT governments have changed their mind about the wis-
dom of a legal obligation, it is enough that panels establish
what the existing law is, leaving it to governments to change
the law by negotiation. Panels are not expected to rewrite the
law to suit present attitudes. There is nothing blameworthy
about rulings that are not accepted.
GATT opinion might be divided, however, about what ob-
jective legal analysis requires. One school of thought, reflecting
Continental jurisprudence, would probably frown on decisions
that subordinate the legal text to the negotiating history and to
the pragmatic sort of legal policy rationale presented above.
That point of view would have found no fault with the DISC
panel's largely economic analysis concluding that Article XVI:4
covered territorial tax laws. A more expansive view of correct
legal analysis would disagree, arguing that negotiating back-
ground and legal policy are relevant sources of law that should
be taken into account, particularly in an institution like GATT
in which enforcement of legal norms largely rests on voluntary
obedience to commitments undertaken in the past. The more
realistic the panel's appraisal of what the commitment was, the
more powerful its ruling will be. Under this more expansive
view, the panel's ruling on the European tax laws would be
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faulted for not taking account of the background to Article
XVI:4.
If one accepts the broader view of GATT legal analysis, it
remains to ask why the panel did not arrive at such a ruling.
The actual reasons for the panel's ruling are not known. Specu-
lation at the time centered on the assumption that the panel
felt it had to rule DISC illegal to maintain the credibility of
GATT legal discipline over export subsidies but could not do so
while exonerating the three European laws because the United
States would not accept a ruling that singled out DISC alone. If
that was the reasoning, the problem with the decision lay in its
starting point assumption that it was not possible to devise a
legal theory distinguishing DISC that would be strong enough
to withstand the expected United States resistance. The miss-
ing ingredient in that case would have been a more sophisti-
cated legal imagination.
Alternatively, the panel could have concluded that Article
XVI:4 really did outlaw territoriality. If so, the problem with
the decision would have been an inadequate understanding of
the relevant legal materials and their significance. The panel
may not have given enough attention to the historical back-
ground showing that Article XVI:4 was never intended to- affect
territoriality. It may also have attaphed too much importance
to the apparent economic policy suggested by the words of Art-
icle XVI:4. This latter type of miscalculation could well have
been induced by the parties' decision to appoint tax experts to
the panel, a departure from normal GATT practice 143 sug-
gesting that the legal problem turned on the sort of objective
analysis tax experts could do.
Tracing the problems involved in the DISC ruling leads to
one central conclusion. Finding the right answer to the nasty
interpretative problem presented by Article XVI:4 would have
required legal work of the highest order. The level of legal
practice in panel proceedings would have had to provide the
panel with a broad and sophisticated exploration of the issues,
the data, the possible solutions, and the ramifications of those
solutions. In 1976, however, GATT litigation procedure was
just beginning to scrape off the rust that had accumulated dur-
ing the antilegalist period of the 1960s. It was simply not ready
to operate at this level.
Improving the level of legal practice requires time. Its
143. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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quality is a function of what all the participants do-govern-
ment parties, Secretariat advisors, and panelists. The input of
each party is affected by the input of the others. Thorough and
careful presentation of issues leads to more thorough and care-
ful decisions, and such decisions in turn set the standard for
what kinds of information and analysis are expected from par-
ties the next time around. Each participant must improve and
be improved by the others.
One of the most important legacies of the DISC case in this
regard was the creation of a separate legal staff within the
GATT Secretariat. The problems of the DISC case had led the
Secretariat to reexamine the "no lawyers" policy established by
its first Director General Sir Eric Wyndham White and fol-
lowed by his successor Olivier Long. When Arthur Dunkel be-
came Director General in 1980, he decided that the old policy
could no longer be followed. In typical GATT fashion, the idea
of a Secretariat legal office had to be introduced very gradually.
First there was just a legal advisor, a senior GATT official near-
ing retirement whose role was portrayed more like that of a
historian-archivist than a lawyer. This was followed by a series
of incremental changes in function and in personnel that even-
tually produced the present legal office, staffed now by four
professionals who work with every panel. The creation of this
office has had a major impact in raising both the quality of
GATT panel decisions over the past decade and the quality of
the legal practice before those panels. It may be the most im-
portant legacy the DISC case left behind.
With all its improvements over the past decade, the level of
GATT legal practice still falls short of what is needed to deal
effectively with difficult legal issues on a regular basis. GATT
law contains a large number of legal texts like Article XVI:4
that paper over policy conflicts by suggesting larger obligations
than the ones governments are actually prepared to assume.
Moreover, as was true of Article XVI:4, many of these provi-
sions strike compromises with existing practices in a way that
offers no coherent theory to guide future application. As the
volume of litigation grows, so do the number and difficulty of
the legal problems presented by such texts.
Each part of the process can be improved. Panel selection
is still ragged, and panelists would benefit from greater con-
tinuity and experience. The Secretariat legal staff could do
more if it were larger. The level of government legal practice
before GATT is particularly uneven, with many governments
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still treating legal appearances as a diplomatic event. Raising
the level of GATT legal practice is definitely a reform objective
worth pursuing.
III. FROM LEGAL RULING TO FINAL OUTCOME:
1976-1984
A. THE INITIAL IMPASSE: 1976-1978
As noted above,' T the four panel reports were issued si-
multaneously on November 2, 1976. The reports were then re-
viewed in six meetings of the GATT Council between
November of 1976 and March of 1978.145 The first five meet-
ings, until November 1977, ended in complete impasse.
The United States indicated it would accept the finding
that DISC was in violation of GATT, provided that the findings
against France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were accepted at
the same time.146 The three European defendants refused to
accept the rulings against themselves. They argued that GATT
Article XVI:4 had never been intended to outlaw territorial tax
laws.147 The European Community called for adoption of the
DISC report and proposed what amounted to a Council decision
overruling the other three reports.148 The United States re-
144. See supra note 78.
145. The summary records of the meetings, in chronological order, are:
GATT Docs. C/M/117 (Nov. 12, 1976 mtg.) at 6-10; C/M/119 (Mar. 2, 1977 mtg.)
at 12-18; C/M/120 (May 23, 1977 mtg.) at 8-11; C/M/122 (July 26, 1977 mtg.) at
9-13; C/M/123 (Nov. 11, 1977 mtg.) at 10-14; C/M/124 (Mar. 14, 1978 mtg.) at 16-
17.
146. The United States's position was evident from the beginning but was
not stated in words of one syllable until the Council meeting of July 26, 1977.
GATT Doc. C/M/122, at 9-10.
147. The defendants' positions were stated in carefully drawn memoranda,
almost legal briefs, written following the report. For France see GATT Docs.
C/97/Add.1 (July 21, 1977); C/97/Rev.1 (Mar. 21, 1977). For Belgium see
GATT Docs. C/98/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 1977); C/98 (Mar. 15, 1977). For the Nether-
lands see GATT Doc. C/99 (Mar. 15, 1977).
The defendants argued in these memoranda that the panel's treatment of
the two parts of the tax-haven transaction as a single transaction constituted
an incorrect definition of export. Their argument never addressed the eco-
nomic reason for treating the two parts as a single transaction: that all the
profits went into the same pocket. Relying on linguistics and history, they
merely argued that government tax jurisdiction has always ended after the
first transaction because that is where governments had concluded that the ex-
port process ended. It ultimately boiled down to the same basic assertion that
GATT Article XVI:4 was never meant to require taxing income earned abroad.
See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
148. Finding a procedural mechanism for overruling the panel report posed
something of a problem, for there were no precedents for this sort of action.
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fused to separate the cases, emphasizing repeatedly that the
European laws had the same economic effects as DISC.149
The refusal to accept the respective panel reports
presented a new and important problem for GATT dispute set-
tlement. The rulings of GATT panels are not binding legal in-
terpretations; they are merely reports to the GATT Contracting
Parties or to its agent, the GATT Council, which alone have the
power to make authoritative rulings.150 Before 1976, however,
the GATT had produced approximately twenty third-party
legal rulings, and in only one case, by then generally forgotten,
had the Contracting Parties failed to adopt the ruling.' 5 1 This
tradition of more or less automatic approval was regarded as
critical to the objectivity of GATT's adjudicatory processes, for
it seemed unlikely that political institutions like the GATT
Council or the Contracting Parties could make legal rulings
free from political influences. At the same time, however, gov-
ernments had to recognize that errors do occur in every legal
Initially, the Belgian delegate had proposed calling the panel back into session
to ask the panel to elaborate on the basis of its decision-a suggestion that
sounded a bit like a court martial. See GATT Doc. C/M/119 (Mar. 2, 1977
mtg.) at 16. The Community finally settled on asking the GATT Council to
authorize its Chairman to give an opinion, after consulting with experts, about
the legal conclusions disputed by the three defendants. See GATT Doc.
C/M/123 (Nov. 11, 1977 mtg.) at 13. A consensus in support of making this re-
quest to the Chairman would have been understood as agreement to overrule
the three contested rulings; diplomats seldom call for a report unless they
agree as to what it will say. The procedure that was actually adopted, five
years later in December of 1981, was to negotiate the text of an "understand-
ing" that would state a conclusion contrary to the report and that would be
adopted at the same time the panel reports were adopted. See infra notes 171-
72 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., GATT Doc. C/102 (Nov. 24, 1977).
150. GATT Article XXIII:2 gives the Contracting Parties the power to
make rulings and to issue recommendations based thereon. The Contracting
Parties have empowered the GATT Council to act for them, but neither the
Contracting Parties nor the Council have ever delegated this power to make
rulings to any tribunal. Parties would, of course, have the power to bind
themselves to accept a panel report, although it is doubtful whether GATT
would accept any role in trying to enforce such a bilateral commitment as
such.
151. The number here is based the author's own classification, in R.
HUDEC, supra note 2, App. A at 275-96. The one exception was a 1956 panel
report that ruled in favor of a West German complaint that Greece had im-
paired a tariff concession on phonograph records by classifying a new type of
record (LPs) under a different heading with a higher rate. GATT Doc. L/580
(Nov. 2, 1956). The ruling was not adopted, due to objections by a number of
developing countries. See GATT Doc. SR.11/16 (Nov. 16, 1956 mtg.). The mat-
ter was eventually settled bilaterally by agreement on a compromise tariff rate
for LPs. GATT Doc. L/765 (Nov. 29, 1957).
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system and that some mechanism for appeal was necessary.152
The five deadlocked Council meetings that took place up to
the end of 1977 represented a certain kind of appellate process
in response to the various claims of error. As time went on, a
consensus emerged among the countries who participated in
the debate-mainly the developed countries who had signed
GATT Article XVI:4. Virtually every delegation that spoke
called for immediate adoption of the DISC report. Most also
took the position that the other three cases required more time
for reflection, which was the diplomatic way of suggesting that
they were wrong.1 5 3 No one spoke in support of the United
States position. By the end of the year, the United States was
isolated.
This process appeared to be the only way to reconcile the
need for some error-correcting procedure with the practice of
consensus decision making. Claims of error would have to be
debated until a consensus developed among the countries not
party to the dispute. When the debate revealed broad agree-
ment that an error had been made, the ruling would not be ap-
proved and might eventually be corrected or set aside. When
the claim of error had no support, pressure would continue un-
til the losing party conceded. Either case, of course, meant
waiting until the isolated party was ready to give up. Whether
the process worked effectively would depend on how often the
GATT could reach consensus and how long it would take to
wear down opposition to the consensus view.
If the DISC case had been resolved by this consensus-build-
ing process within the first year or so, the adjudication proce-
dure would probably have been considered successful. The
three counterclaims were not settled, however, until December
1981, and the ruling on DISC did not produce an undertaking to
152. With or without an appeal mechanism, the lack of any quality control
in the Council's review process also requires, in the author's opinion, viewing
"adopted" panel reports as something short of a formal legal ruling by the
Contracting Parties-most likely, as a general approval of the recommended
solution but not necessarily a binding approval of the legal reasoning stated in
the report. Some sense of precedent normally attaches to these decisions,
which is as it should be, but the legal quality of panel decisions over the years
has not been good enough to merit more binding status.
153. Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and Austria took the position that DISC
alone should be changed. GATT Docs. C/M/122 (July 26, 1977 mtg.) at 11-12,
C/M/120 (May 23, 1977 mtg.) at 8-10. Only the Nordics stood aside, taking the
rather vague position that normal procedures should be followed in all four
cases. Id. C/M/122 at 12, C/M/120 at 9.
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comply until October 1982.154 Obviously, these events proved
that consensus decision making can subject GATT adjudication
procedures to serious delay. If one retraces the agony of the ap-
proval process step by step, however, it will be seen that the
causes of the delay were a series of rather unusual political sit-
uations that kept popping up to block one settlement after an-
other. The political setting of the DISC case may not have been
unique, but it was far from typical.
B. THREE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES: 1978-1980
At the beginning of the review process, the possibility that
the United States might repeal DISC due to opposition in
Washington emerged once again. President Carter had prom-
ised to repeal DISC during his 1976 election campaign. 155 In
March of 1978, the United States delegation announced that
President Carter had formally asked the Congress to repeal
DISC entirely.156 At the same meeting, the United States also
stated that it was presenting new proposals to France, Belgium,
and the Netherlands to resolve the three counterclaims, imply-
ing the United States might be prepared to concede the legality
of the territoriality principle. The United States delegation was
still not willing to agree to formal acceptance of the DISC re-
port, however.
The United States's initiative took the DISC cases off the
GATT Council agenda while the repeal legislation was pending
in Congress. That legislative effort was aborted in mid-1978
when it became clear that the prospects' for Congressional ap-
proval were nonexistent, 157 but by then GATT was entering the
closing months of the five-year negotiating effort known as the
Tokyo Round,158 and negotiations over a new Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code were producing another type of progress toward
a solution.
The Subsidies Code, adopted in early 1979, carefully took
154. See infra notes 171-83 and accompanying text.
155. The promise occurred in a televised debate between Candidate Carter
and President Ford. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1976, at A21, col. 3. The fact
that the Carter Administration was considering repeal legislation was con-
firmed by the United States in the GATT Council meeting of July 26, 1977.
GATT Doc. C/M/122 (July 26, 1977 mtg.) at 10.
156. GATT Doc. C/M/124 (Mar. 14, 1978 mtg.) at 16. For the President's
proposal, see President's Message to Congress on Tax Reduction and Reform,
14 PuB. PAPERS 158, 172 (Jan. 21, 1978).
157. See N.Y. Times, June 27, 1978, at D6, col. 1.
158. See supra note 73.
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no position on the DISC case,1 5 9 but it tended to affirm DISC's
illegality by abolishing the bilevel pricing requirement, by in-
cluding interest-free tax deferral in the list of prohibited tax
subsidies, and by expressing a general policy to tighten the pro-
hibition against export subsidies.1 60 With respect to the cases
involving the three European tax systems, the Code also sug-
gested a settlement of sorts. It affirmed the importance of the
arm's length pricing requirement, a key United States concern
in those cases, while on the other hand it affirmed that the
Code's prohibition of export subsidies was not intended to limit
"measures to avoid.., double taxation," a common rhetorical
shorthand for the territoriality principle.161
In June of 1979, a few months after the Subsidies Code was
adopted, a United States Treasury official took the process one
step farther by negotiating a confidential settlement of all four
cases. Even though the principles of the settlement had al-
ready been stated in the new Subsidies Code provisions, a pub-
lic announcement was apparently deemed inadvisable, no doubt
because approval of the Tokyo Round agreements was pending
before Congress. The confidential settlement involved the fol-
lowing points: (1) the United States agreed that DISC as pres-
ently structured was GATT-illegal; (2) while the President's
1978 initiative to repeal DISC had failed and could not be intro-
duced again until after the 1980 Presidential election, the
United States would submit conforming legislation in 1981;
(3) until then, the Community would leave the DISC report on
the table and would not retaliate for lack of progress; (4) in the
Spring of 1980, the United States would agree to a GATT deci-
sion adopting the three European reports separately from the
DISC report, with an attached understanding that would over-
turn the central finding of GATT illegality by stating that Arti-
159. The disclaimer appears in Annex A to the Subsidies Code, supra note
28, in footnote 2 to the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, first paragraph.
See GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. at 82 n.2 (1980).
160. The bilevel pricing requirement was abolished by being omitted from
the export subsidy prohibition in Article 9:1 of the Subsidies Code. See GATT,
BISD, 26th Supp. at 68. Interest-free deferral is mentioned in item (e) of the
Illustrative List in the Code's Annex. See id. at 81. One example of the more
general tightening was the exclusion of mineral products from the exception
for "primary products," found in a footnote in Article 9. See id. at 68 n.7. For
the original definition of primary products, see supra note 22.
161. The provisions appear in Annex A of the Subsidies Code, in footnote 2
to the Illustrative list, second and third paragraphs, immediately following the
disclaimer regarding the DISC report. See GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. at 82 n.2
(1980).
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cle XVI:4 did not prohibit territorial tax laws; (5) the
Community would agree to a strong statement in the under-
standing supporting the United States's position on the inpor-
tance of arm's length pricing rules.
162
Now it was the turn of the trade policy officials to disrupt
the Treasury Department's handling of the process. In early
1980 the United States Administration repudiated the 1979 set-
tlement as unauthorized. 163 While there had in fact been a
question as to the United States negotiator's authority-an-
other episode in the jurisdictional maneuvering between the
Treasury Department and the United States Trade Representa-
tive-the decision not to honor the settlement was in essence a
new decision that the United States government could not, or
should not, settle. The main factor was probably a political
"could not." Legal control of subsidies, and particularly export
subsidies, had become a central concern during the Congres-
sional debates over ratification of the Tokyo Round agree-
ments. The Carter Administration had persuaded the Congress
to enact a substantial liberalization of the United States coun-
tervailing duty law' 64 in exchange for assurances that the new
Tokyo Round Subsidies Code would bring about more effective
legal regulation of subsidies in GATT. It just would not do, as
the first demonstration of GATT's new legal rigor, to ask the
Congress for legislation to implement a settlement surrender-
ing a United States export subsidy while agreeing to do nothing
about three European laws found to be export subsidies in the
same lawsuit.
There was quite possibly also a political "should not" be-
hind the United States's repudiation. Notwithstanding the
162. The agreement is generally known as the Hufbauer agreement. The
text of the confidential GATT document recording of this confidential agree-
ment was published in Treasury Took View that DISC Violated GAT, TAx
NOTES, Aug. 2, 1982, at 453.
163. See statement of United States Representative, GATT Doc. C/M/160
(July 21, 1982 mtg.) at 6.
164. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144
(codified at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1671f, 1675-1677g (1980 & Supp. 1987)). Coun-
tervailing duties are special additional duties imposed on subsidized imports
that are found to cause material injury to a domestic industry. The chief liber-
alizing amendment in 1979 added the material injury requirement. GATT Ar-
ticle VI had required such laws to have a material injury requirement ever
since 1947, but the nonconforming United States law had up to this point been
excused by a grandfather clause for pre-1947 legislation of a mandatory char-
acter. See Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
308.
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glowing claims made for the Subsidies Code, the Code was in
fact only a slightly dressed-up restatement of pre-1979 GATT
subsidies law with a new and more forceful-looking adjudica-
tion procedure to back it up.165 The Code negotiations had re-
vealed strong opposition to greater discipline over subsidies,
with many governments, including the European Community,
deeply committed to maintaining existing programs. Commu-
nity export subsidies on agriculture, long a priority target of
United States agricultural interests, had been labeled nonnego-
tiable by the Community. A prudent diplomat might well have
wanted to delay playing the DISC card until the Community's
behavior in response to the new Subsidies Code could be seen
more clearly.
Repudiation of the 1979 settlement meant that, apart from
the new Subsidies Code provisions, the two-year effort at infor-
mal settlement had come up empty. A second round of formal
proceedings had become necessary.
C. DISC's LAST STAND: 1980-1984
Formal consideration of the DISC cases returned to the
agenda of the GATT Council in December of 1980. France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands requested the Council to recog-
nize that a de facto settlement had already been reached in the
three counterclaims and to formalize that settlement in a
Council decision. The proposed decision would adopt the three
panel reports subject to an understanding that GATT Article
XVI:4 does not prohibit territorial tax systems.1 66 The under-
standing, of course, would constitute a Council decision overrul-
ing the finding of GATT inconsistency in the three reports.
The United States asked for more time to consider the pro-
posal, implying that it was not yet ready to abandon its position
that DISC had to be treated the same as the other three tax
laws. During the following twelve months, the European pro-
165. The differences between appearances and reality in the Subsidies
Code negotiations are explored in detail in Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensi-
ble": Some Reflections of the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72
MINN. L. REV. 211, 219-26 (1987). Another account of the story set in the con-
text of United States-European Community conflicts over agricultural trade is
given in Hudec, supra note 47, at 38-40.
166. The three governments raised the issue in substantially identical
memoranda, which recounted the history of the case and asserted that the
United States had indicated a willingness to accept the legality of territorial
tax systems. GATT Docs. C/114, C/115, C/116 (Dec. 8, 1980). The memoranda
were discussed at the GATT Council meeting of December 18, 1980. GATT
Doc. C/M/145 at 1-5.
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posal was raised at six more Council meetings and each time it
was deferred for further discussion. 67 Third-country requests
for time to study the proposed understanding caused a two-
month delay in late 1981, but the main source of delay was the
United States's renewed effort to defend DISC. 68 United
States policy, which had already started returning to this defen-
sive position under the Carter Administration, appeared to
have hardened with the change of Administration in early 1981.
The new Reagan Administration was undoubtedly con-
fronting intensified political pressures against settlement. It
had promised that it would defend United States trade interests
more vigorously than the previous Administration-the peren-
nial "No-More-Mister-Nice-Guy" pledge.' 69 Thus, it could not
afford to begin its term of office by making a one-sided surren-
der of DISC. In addition, it had an extensive legislative agenda
in which there would be no room for lower priority matters
like DISC repeal for several years. Finally, as the United
States began to file legal complaints under the Subsidies Code
later in 1981,170 it became clear that the European Community
intended to defend its own export subsidies in agriculture
against all legal attacks under the new Code. The impending
failure of the Subsidies Code made it seem all the more unwise
to surrender DISC unilaterally.
In December 1981 the United States nonetheless agreed to
a GATT Council decision approving all four reports, subject to
an understanding.' 7 ' The understanding read:
The Council adopts these Reports on the understanding that with re-
spect to these cases, and in general, economic processes (including
transactions involving exported goods) located outside the territorial
limits of the exporting country need not be subject to taxation by the
exporting country and should not be regarded as export activities in
167. The summary records of the meetings, in chronological order, are:
C/M/146 (Mar. 10, 1981 mtg.) at 7-9; C/M/148 (June 11, 1981 mtg.) at 2;
C/M/149 (July 15, 1981 mtg.) at 2; C/M/151 (Oct. 6, 1981 mtg.) at 2-3; C/M/152
(Nov. 3, 1981 mtg.) at 2-3; C/M/153 (Nov. 6, 1981 mtg.) at 7-8.
168. The European Community reported that the United States had agreed
to consider accepting a legal ruling against DISC as early as mid-1981. See
GATT Doc. C/M/159 (June 29-30, 1982 mtg.) at 6. If so, Washington must have
once again backed away.
169. See, e.g., the International Economic Policy plank of the 1980 Republi-
can platform, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS OF 1980: SuPPLE-
MENT TO NATIONAL PARTY PLATFoRMs, 1840-1976 at 218 (1982).
170. The first United States complaint involved export subsidies on wheat
flour. See infra note 184.
171. The decision was adopted at the Council meeting of December 7-8,
1981, GATT Doc. C/M/154 at 6-7.
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terms of Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement. It is further un-
derstood that Article XVI:4 requires that arm's length pricing be ob-
served . . . . Furthermore, Article XVI:4 does not prohibit the
adoption of measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source
income. 17
2
While the December 1981 decision marked the end of the
three counterclaims, the DISC case was far from over. That de-
cision, it now appears, was actually a delicate compromise about
the legal status of DISC. The understanding clearly exonerated
the three European laws, and all governments understood this.
Anyone familiar with the DISC case would have assumed that
the understanding did not exonerate DISC, because the United
States had never claimed that DISC was an exemption for in-
come earned abroad. Moments after the reports and the under-
standing were approved, however, a rather bizarre colloquy
occurred. The United States offered a unilateral explanation of
what had just been agreed to, claiming that GATT Article
XVI:4, as now interpreted by the understanding, required gov-
ernments to tax only as much income from exports as would be
taxed under a territorial system.173 The United States did not
explain. What it meant, of course, was that DISC did not vio-
late Article XVI:4 either, because it did not reduce income
taxes by more than they would be reduced through tax-haven
operations under a territorial system. The European Commu-
nity and Canada immediately expressed their disagreement 74
but did not pursue the matter. The colloquy was, in short, a
way of announcing that the impasse over DISC itself had not
been resolved. In agreeing to the December 1981 decision, the
United States had only agreed to free the hostages, not to lay
down its arms.
It took only ten months for the Contracting Parties to beat
down this new United States defense of DISC based on the 1981
understanding, but it was a rather interesting ten months be-
cause both sides began treating the case with new energy. The
final round commenced soon after the December 1981 Council
decision, with demands from the European Community and
Canada that the United States implement the DISC report by
repealing its law.175 The United States, following through on
172. Id. at 6; see also GATT, BISD, 28th Supp. at 114 (1982) (quoting
understanding).
173. GATT Doc. C/M/154 (Dec. 7-8, 1981 mtg.) at 8.
174. Id. at 8-9.
175. The skirmishing began in the meetings of the Subsidy Code's commit-
tee of signatories. See GATT Doc. SCM/18 (Mar. 29, 1982) (Canadian request
for formal notification of DISC).
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its delphic pronouncement of December 1981, replied that the
1981 understanding had exonerated DISC as well.176 After sev-
eral more preliminary skirmishes, 17' the United States finally
presented a full statement of its new theory in a long and
highly technical legal brief on tax theory at the June 1982
Council meeting.178 The United States recalled that the 1981
understanding permitted a government to exempt from tax in-
come derived from economic processes outside its territory. In
the United States's view, every export transaction involves
some profit from economic processes outside the country, even
if the exporter does not act through a separate foreign entity.
The DISC exemption, the United States explained, was just a
fair rule-of-thumb way of separating out the foreign-earned
part of export income and not taxing it.179
No other GATT government supported the United States.
Most had probably not even understood the June 1982 defense,
but that did not matter. Governments had understood what
they had voted for in the 1981 understanding, and it was not
this. They had meant to exonerate territorial tax systems, but
not DISC. It was yet another instance when the history of a
GATT legal decision prevailed over an artful legal analysis of
what it said.
This final round of United States resistance provoked the
European Community into new efforts to increase the pressure.
The Community proposed that the GATT Council adopt formal
decisions declaring DISC to be in violation, ordering the United
States to comply, and finding the situation ripe for retaliation
by injured countries. 80 Under GATT's practice of consensus
decision making, these decisions had no chance of being
176. GATT Doc. SCM/19 (Apr. 20, 1982).
177. See, e.g., GATT Docs. C/M/157 (May 7, 1982 mtg.) at 13-18; SCM/22
(Apr. 26, 1982) (formal notification of DISC by Canada).
178. GATT Doc. C/M/159 (June 29-30, 1982 mtg.) at 8-9. The United States
supported its argument by citing (and, alas, explaining at length) numerous
other provisions of United States corporate income tax law that allocated in-
come between foreign and domestic jurisdictions in situations in which no sep-
arate foreign entity existed. According to GATT document C/M/159, the text
of the United States statement "in extenso" is preserved in GATT document
C/W/389/Supp.1, a document series that has not been derestricted. Id. at 8 n.1.
The full text of the United States statement is also available in Tax Notes
Microf che Data Base, Doc. 82-7501 (July 19, 1982).
Contrary to practice in the early phases of the case, when the Treasury
Department defended DISC, see supra note 41, this defense was delivered by
the Deputy United States Trade Representative.
179. GATT Doc. C/M/159 (June 29-30, 1982 mtg.) at 8-9.
180. See GATT Docs. C/IM/160 (July 21, 1982 mtg.) at 4 (description of deci-
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adopted over United States opposition, but they did create new
events that gave governments a new opportunity to express
their views in a focused manner. The Community's proposed
decisions sparked a lively debate at GATT Council meetings in
May, June, and July of 1982.181 By July patience with the
United States defense of DISC began to wear thin. Several
delegations accused the United States of abusing the consensus
practice. When these statements had no effect, the Chairman
adjourned the meeting to determine if informal hammering in
the corridors might produce some movement. When the meet-
ing resumed, the only additional step that had been agreed to
was a statement by the Chair that "it was the opinion of the
majority of the Council members that the United States should
take appropriate action to ensure that the DISC legislation was
brought into conformity with the provisions of the General
Agreement."'1 2 When angered, the majority would express it-
self as a majority, but even then it would not call for a vote to
force the Council to act.
The United States defense was fading, however, and by Oc-
tober of 1982 the United States was ready to give up and prom-
ise a new statute. The increasing strength of the GATT
opposition might have precipitated this prompt retreat by itself,
but other factors were also at work. One was the approaching
GATT Ministerial Meeting in November 1982, which by Octo-
ber was already threatening to deny support for a United States
proposal to establish a new agenda of GATT negotiations. 83 A
more important factor was an emerging crisis in the function-
ing of GATT adjudication generally. By October 1982 the
United States was locked in five other bitterly contested GATT
lawsuits against the European Community.184 The Community
sion proposed in C/W/392); C/M/157 (May 27, 1982 mtg.) at 16 (text of decision
proposed in C/W/384).
181. GATT Docs. C/M/157 (May 7, 1982 mtg.) at 13-18; C/M/159 (June 29-
30, 1982 mtg.) at 5-13; C/M/160 (July 21, 1982 mtg.) at 2-9.
182. GATT Doc. C/M/160 (July 21, 1982 mtg.) at 9.
183. United States concern over success of the 1982 Ministerial meeting
proved to be well founded, because the meeting failed to produce the decisions
sought by the United States. See 7 Int'l Trade Rep. U.S. Import Weekly
(BNA) No. 9, at 281 (Dec. 1, 1982).
184. Most of the GATT documents pertaining to the five cases remain re-
stricted. The cases are described generally in USITC REPORT, supra note 44,
at 1-22 to -24, items 65, 66, 68, 69, 72. The cases were:
European Community: Value-Added Tax (VAT) and Threshold
(July 1982 Procurement Code complaint; panel ruling in favor of
United States position; report eventually adopted in 1986, case set-
tled). The panel report is reprinted in GATT, BISD, 31st Supp. at 247
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was using the United States position in the DISC case as a justi-
fication for similar blocking and foot-dragging behavior in each
of these other lawsuits. The DISC no longer looked like a bar-
gaining chip. It had become a stone around the neck of the en-
tire United States policy to improve GATT legal disciplinelea
In July 1984 the United States announced that Congress
had enacted legislation that replaced DISC with a new type of
tax-haven export subsidy, FSC, that was consistent with the
territoriality principle.18 6 During the next year and a half, a
desultory exchange of fire took place over the new FSC law, in-
volving both challenges to the GATT legality of forgiving some
$10 billion of deferred DISC taxes and questions as to whether
the foreign activities required of FSC were the sort of extra-
(1985). On the follow-up, see id., 32d Supp. at 152 (1986); id. 33d Supp.
at 193 (1987).
European Community: Tariff Treatment of Citrus Products
from Certain Mediterranean Countries (June 1982 complaint; panel
ruling in favor of United States; adoption blocked by European Com-
munity and others). On the follow-up, see GATT Doc. L/5909 (Nov.
19, 1985) at 102-11.
European Community: Production Aids Granted on Canned
Peaches, Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes
(March 1982 complaint; panel ruling in favor of United States; adop-
tion blocked by European Community; settled in 1986). The panel's
preliminary report is reprinted in 20 Int'l Trade Rep. U.S. Export
Weekly (BNA) 1028 (June 5, 1984). On the follow-up, see GATT
Docs. L/6091 (Nov. 19, 1986) at 18; L/5909 (Nov. 19, 1985) at 97-101.
European Community: Subsidies on Exports of Pasta Products
(March 1982 complaint under Subsidies Code; panel ruled 4-1 for
United States; European Community and others blocked adoption of
majority ruling). The panel report is reprinted in 8 Int'l Trade Rep.
U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) No. 12, at 468 (June 22, 1983); on the fol-
low-up, see GATT, BISD, 33d Supp. 16, at 201 (1987).
European Community: Subsidies on Exports of Wheat Flour (Oc-
tober 1981 complaint under Subsidies Code; panel unable to reach a
conclusion; United States blocked adoption of report). The panel deci-
sion is reprinted in 18 Int'l Trade Rep. U.S. Export Weekly (BNA)
No. 20, at 899 (Mar. 8, 1983). On the follow-up, see GATT, BISD, 33d
Supp. 16, at 201 (1987).
185. The Reagan Administration explained its decision to Congress by re-
porting that the DISC deadlock was undermining United States efforts to chal-
lenge foreign subsidies and efforts to improve dispute settlement procedures.
Foreign Sales Corporation Act: Hearings on S. 1804 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1984) (statement of Robert E. Iighthizer,
Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.). The Senate Finance Committee's explanation of the
reasons for changing DISC noted the GATT majority's view against the legal-
ity of DISC and then cited the possibility of retaliation by the Community, the
danger of causing a breakdown of GATT dispute settlement procedures, and
the general diplomatic isolation of the United States. 1984 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 13, at 634. The Committee endorsed the official United States posi-
tion that DISC was really GATT-legal. Id. at 634-35.
186. GATT Doc. C/M/180 (July 11, 1984 mtg.) at 5.
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territorial business activity for which tax exemptions were per-
mitted under the 1981 understanding. 87 These protests eventu-
ally faded away without further litigation and, as the silence
lengthened, it became clear that the DISC case had at long last
ended.'8 8
D. EVALUATING THE OUTCOME
What did the twelve years of DISC litigation accomplish?
The 1984 FSC law 8 9 is in many respects the measure of that
accomplishment. Its significance has several dimensions. If
publicly acknowledged respect for GATT law is the measure,
the enactment of FSC law was a considerable achievement. For
once the United States Congress passed a law whose only pur-
pose, openly stated, was to bring United States law into con-
formity with GATT legal obligations.190 Even if the new law
made no significant change in the underlying export subsidy, it
was a precedent that affirmed the political legitimacy of chang-
ing laws to comply with GATT, a substantial contribution.
If the significance of the FSC law is measured by the sweat
and toil expended on behalf of GATT legal demands, again the
FSC earns high marks. Legislation restructuring tax advan-
tages requires a long and painful process, and DISC-FSC was
no exception. Businesses benefiting from DISC were reluctant
to agree to any modification of benefits and had to be brought
along inch by inch.191 Congress was even less enthusiastic, for
legislators would gain nothing politically by voting for the law.
187. Questions about the GATT legality of FSC were raised even before
the FSC law was passed. See GATT Doc. C/M/171 (Oct. 3, 1983 mtg.). In late
1984 the European Community invoked GATT Article XXII consultations on
FSC. See GATT Doc. C/M/183 (Nov. 6-8, 20, 1984 mtg.) at 76. The parties met
and exchanged views in early 1985. See GATT Doc. SR.41/3 (Nov. 26, 1985
mtg.).
188. The last mention of DISC or FSC in GATT documents that the author
has been able to find appeared in a report by the European Community on the
GATT Article XXII consultations in November 1985. GATT Doc. SR.41/3
(Nov. 26, 1985 mtg.).
189. The legislation establishing FSC is the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 985-1103 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 921-997 (Supp. II 1985)).
For the Senate Finance Committee's explanation of FSC, see 1984 SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 13, at 636-61.
190. See, for example, the Senate Finance Committee's explanation of the
reasons for FSC, described supra note 185.
191. The quid pro quo that induced corporate taxpayers to accept the
slightly more onerous FSC procedure in the end was the forgiveness of all de-
ferred DISC tax liability. Although collection was highly unlikely, corpora-
tions were willing to pay a little something to remove the risk entirely.
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Endless days of slogging were required to gather the necessary
support.
If, on the other hand, the significance of the FSC law is
measured by the policy change it effected, the accomplishment
has to be rated mediocre at best. The announced purpose of the
FSC law was to change the form of the DISC subsidy to make
it GATT-legal, while changing its substance as little as possi-
ble.192 The new law accomplished these objectives.
First, the value of the subsidy remained nearly the same.
Overall, the change from DISC to FSC was revenue neutral;
FSC granted the same dollar amount of tax subsidy as DISC
would have done.' 93 Individually, exporters received a tax ex-
emption on approximately the same percentage of total export
income they had received under DISC.'9
Second, although the GATT's territoriality exemption ap-
plied only to income earned from extraterritorial economic ac-
tivity, Congress naturally tried to make the extraterritorial
requirements as easy to meet as possible.195 Congress made
them so easy to meet that the FSC's foreign activity require-
ments are largely a sham. The FSC does not have to be a sepa-
rate foreign business operation, as is required under most
territorial systems.' 96 All of the FSC's income-earning activi-
192. In the cover letter accompanying the Administration's technical expla-
nation of its FSC proposal, the United States Treasury Department announced
four objectives for FSC that were to be the Administration's theme song
throughout the legislative process: "The bill was drafted with four objectives:
to meet U.S. obligations under the GATT; to be revenue neutral with the
DISC; to preserve to the extent possible the position of existing DISC users;
and to provide incentives for small business. We believe the bill accomplishes
these objectives." Treasury Explains Foreign Sales Corporation Proposal, TAX
NOTES, Feb. 6, 1984, at 440-41 (reprinting cover letter).
193. 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 661.
194. Generally, the minimum tax saving under FSC is 15-16% of export in-
come, see 7 Fed. Taxes (P-H) S 30,681, at 30,700.13 (1988), as opposed to approx-
imately 17% of income sheltered under DISC, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text, and now provided for in the new interest-bearing DISC,
see infra note 200.
195. The offshore requirements were, as might be expected, more or less
negotiated with the affected business community. See, e.g., 18 Int'l Trade Rep.
U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 20, at 786 (Feb. 22, 1983).
196. During the meeting at which the GATT Council adopted the Decem-
ber 1981 understanding exempting territorial tax systems from GATT Article
XVI:4, the delegate of Belgium, speaking for all three European defendants,
expressed the following unilateral understanding of the exemption:
[The understanding does not exclude from the provisions of Article
XVI the operation of differential tax practices based on the establish-
ment of fictitious companies located abroad but where all their activi-
ties are directed from within the borders of the country of the parent
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ties can be performed by an agent under contract, and in most
cases the agent is the parent corporation doing its export busi-
ness as usual.197 The FSC's foreign business location need only
be a desk, a filing cabinet, and a telephone, and nothing pre-
vents several other FSCs from occupying the same room. The
FSC needs foreign records, a foreign bank account, one nonresi-
dent director, and management meetings abroad, but these can
all be produced with minimal effort.198 Even the foreign ex-
penditures required of the FSC or its agent-parent can be satis-
fied easily. The allocation rules for many expenditures such as
transportation, risk insurance, and advertising make it possible
to structure rather routine export practices so that their costs
will be classified as foreign expenditures.199  And, indeed,
company and where the tax legislation of the country of the parent
company does not provide for full taxation of these activities.
GATT Doc. C/M/154 (Dec. 7-8, 1981 mtg.) at 7 (quotation from summary
record).
197. See 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 640, 646-47.
198. The minimum office requirements are stated in Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1
(1987). The interpretation of the "foreign management" requirement also il-
lustrates the minimalist approach. Although the regulations provide that all
directors and stockholders meetings must be held outside the United States, a
meeting can be held by telephone conference call, subject to compliance with
local law, as long as a majority of the quorum (for example, two of five direc-
tors) are outside the United States during the call-with "outside" not being
limited to the host country. Treas. Reg. § 1.924(c)-i (1987).
199. The easiest way FSCs are permitted to satisfy the requirement of for-
eign business activity ("foreign economic process" in GATT parlance) is for
the FSC, or its agent-parent, to incur 85% "foreign costs" in two of five ex-
pense categories: (1) advertising and sales promotion; (2) processing customer
orders and arranging for delivery; (3) transportation; (4) determination and
transmittal of a final invoice or statement of account and the receipt of pay-
ment; and (5) assumption of credit risk. See I.R.C. § 924(d)(2), (e) (1987). Of
these, transportation seems a particularly effortless way to incur foreign costs,
because the Regulations treat the "foreign" share of FSC transportation costs
as the ratio of a shipment's mileage "outside U.S. Customs territory" to its to-
tal mileage, and then provide that "mileage outside U.S. Customs territory"
begins at the point where goods are delivered to an international carrier.
Treas. Reg. § 1.924(e)-1(c)(3) (1987). The assumption-of-credit-risk category
appears even easier, because it permits the cost of insuring credit risk with an
unrelated insurance company to be considered "foreign" whenever the buyer
whose payment is being insured is foreign. Treas. Reg. § 1.924(e)-1(e)(2)(ii),
1.924(e)-1(e)(3) (1987). Advertising and solicitation could also be easy by tak-
ing advantage of the regulation providing that the cost of mailings, solicita-
tions, and advertising is foreign if the audience to whom they are directed is
foreign, even if prepared and sent from the United States. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.924(e)-1(a)(1)(iii), (iv), (v), ex.(4) (1987).
For an analysis focusing in greater detail on the easy ways out, see Note,
The Making of a Subsidy, 1984: The Tax and International Trade Implications
of the Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1327, 1344-47 &
nn.109-16 (1986). See also id. at 1352-53 (concluding that FSC is subject to
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"small FSCs" (those with. under $5 million in export receipts)
do not need to satisfy the foreign expenditure requirement at
all.200 The provision for small FSCs clearly does not comply
with the GATT's territoriality exception, and the law's defini-
tion of extraterritorial economic activity is not really con-
forming, either.
In substance, then, the DISC lawsuit changed very little.
The United States won its major point that tax laws based on
the territoriality principle had the effects of an export subsidy
and that the United States was therefore entitled to create
some sort of compensating export subsidy in return. The Euro-
pean Community prevailed to the extent of requiring that the
compensating subsidy comply, at least in form, with the territo-
riality principle. Compliance with that principle, even if only
in form, provides more of a limitation than existed under the
wide-open domestic model for DISC, but not much more, espe-
cially when subsidies to smaller exporters are excused. The dif-
ference hardly seems worth twelve years of litigation.
One school of thought suggests that the final substantive
result was not that important for the European Community.
The Community's primary interest in bringing and maintaining
the lawsuit, that school argues, was to inflict a humbling legal
experience on the United States. United States lawsuits against
the Community throughout this period were numerous and ir-
ritatingly self-righteous. Without the occasional chastisement
of its DISC failures, the United States legal policy could well
have become unbearable, particularly as it might have affected
the Community's Common Agricultural Policy.20 1 Whether re-
GATT legal challenge due to minimal character of its foreign requirements).
For a similar analysis, see Pastor, Foreign Sales Corporations: Cause for Deja
Vu?, 9 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 63, 94 (1985) ("Substantively, the foreign in-
corporation, foreign management and foreign economic process requirements
[of FSC] are trivial modifications to the DISC provisions.").
200. I.R.C. § 924(b)(2); see 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 657-59.
Small exporters were also permitted to defer taxes by continuing to sell
through DISCs, without any foreign presence, but the deferral is now limited
to profits on the first $10 million of qualified export receipts, and interest at
the Treasury bill rate must be paid on the deferred taxes. I.R.C.
§ 995(b)(1)(E); id § 955(f)(1)(B).
201. In another work the author argues that the legal policy behind an-
other upsurge of European Community legal complaints after 1982 was essen-
tially the policy described here-a policy of counterpunching to remind the
United States that others could and would play the same game. Hudec, supra
note 47, at 26, 43-44. The United States legal onslaught that triggered the
Community counterpunching of the 1980s is described supra note 184 and ac-
companying text.
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lief from United States legal pressure was in fact the Commu-
nity's main objective, it probably was the main payoff.
It remains to ask why the substantive result of the DISC
lawsuit was not any better. The poor result can, of course, be
explained simply in terms of United States legislative politics.
Once Congress creates a tax benefit for a broad segment of
United States industry, the combined lobbying strength of all
those industries makes it next to impossible to pass legislation
taking the benefit away. The cost-benefit criticism of DISC-
the huge revenue loss in exchange for a problematic impact on
exports in a world of floating exchange rates-was a vastly
more powerful political argument against DISC than were its
GATT problems, and yet even this argument has been defeated
over and over again.
It must also be noted, however, that the forces on the
GATT side were never very strong. Governments may have
reached a consensus that DISC was wrong, but once the territo-
riality exception to GATT Article XVI:4 was recognized, the
demand to root out the underlying subsidy in DISC no longer
had much force. Most governments recognized that the FSC
subsidy did not correct the narrow legal problems that sepa-
rated DISC from the European tax subsidies, 20 2 but no follow-
up complaint was forthcoming. The GATT no doubt found it
difficult, after all this time, to work up much enthusiasm about
the precise manner in which roughly similar export subsidies
were being granted.20 3
202. Even the Senate Finance Committee acknowledged the presence of
GATT legal complaints about FSC before enactment. The Committee was
concerned enough to say in its report: "In light of the considerable effort re-
quired to replace the DISC and the new burdens placed on the U.S. exporters,
the committee expects the Administration to vigorously defend this legislation
against any GATT challenge and to inform the committee immediately of all
GATT developments relating to this legislation." 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 13, at 635.
203. The GATT's de facto acceptance of FSC has certain elements of a
remedy based on a theory of nonviolation nullification and impairment. That
theory is based on GATT Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that governments
may bring complaints about nullification and impairment of anticipated bene-
fits caused by actions of other governments, even when those actions are not
in violation of GATT obligations. For a detailed discussion of this doctrine and
the GATT experience under it, see Hudec, Retaliation against "Unreasonable"
Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and
Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1975).
The United States established that territorial tax systems, though legal,
impaired the no-export-subsidy benefits governments might expect to obtain
from subscribing to GATT Article XVI:4. The normal remedy in a nonviola-
tion nullification case, if it goes that far, is an excuse from one's obligations
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The GATT response to FSC was also tempered by the
growing breakdown of consensus over subsidy law generally.
The United States had been trying to repair the breakdown in
this area in 1982 when it accepted the DISC finding and agreed
to implement it. For the most part, however, the lack of a solid
consensus about subsidy law diminished the pressure GATT
was able to mount against DISC from the beginning. The sub-
stantive disarray persists. In fact, it has worsened in the decade
following the DISC decisions. One of the paradoxical facts
about the DISC legal ruling is that, since 1975, it is the only
legal complaint about export subsidies in which the GATT has
made a ruling of legal violation and been able to have that rul-
ing accepted and implemented. 20 4 The root problem in subsidy
sufficient to restore the balance of advantage-taking away from others as
much as has been taken from you. It could be argued that GATT, through its
de facto acceptance of FSC, has in effect excused United States obligations
enough to permit this parody of a territorial tax system as compensation for
the nullification of GATT Article XVI:4 benefits caused by territorial tax laws
in Europe and elsewhere.
The analogy to a nullification and impairment remedy should not be
pushed too far, however. The United States claim of impairment did not sat-
isfy the unforseeability requirement normally imposed in nonviolation cases
involving tariff concessions. The United States knew that governments were
practicing the territoriality system when GATT Article XVI:4 was adopted in
1955 and when it was put into force in 1960. Indeed, at that time its own pre-
Subpart-F income tax law granted substantially similar tax benefits. The un-
expected event that put United States exporters at a disadvantage was Subpart
F itself; in effect, the United States impaired its own benefits.
It might be safer, then, to classify GATT's acceptance of FSC as an ad hoc
arrangement, resting partly on elements of nonviolation theory and partly on
institutional exhaustion after 12 years of litigation.
204. For sources describing the subsequent breakdown, see supra note 165.
According to unpublished data collected by the author, the following, in chron-
ological order, are the GATT complaints about export subsidies filed in the
years since the DISC case:
European Community: Refunds on Exports of Malted Barley,
GATT Doc. L/4588 (Nov. 1, 1977) (complaint by Chile; not pursued).
European Community: Refunds on Exports of Sugar, GATT Doc.
L/4701 (Sept. 25, 1978) (complaint by Australia; panel unable to find
violation). See GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. at 290 (1980).
European Community: Refunds on Exports of Sugar, GATT Doc.
L/4722 (Nov. 14, 1978) (complaint by Brazil; panel unable to find vio-
lation). See GATT, BISD, 27th Supp. at 69, 97 (1981).
European Community: Subsidies on Exports of Wheat Flour,
GATT Doc. SCM/10 (Oct. 8, 1981) (complaint by United States under
Subsidies Code; panel unable to reach a conclusion), supra note 184.
European Community: Subsidies on Exports of Pasta Products
(March 1982 complaint under Subsidies Code; panel ruled 4-1 for
United States; European Community and others blocked adoption of
majority ruling), supra note 184.
European Community: Export Subsidies on Sugar (April 1982
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litigation has been, and remains, the absence of consensus.
IV. THE LESSONS OF THE DISC CASE: REPRISE
The first step in understanding the lessons of the DISC
case is to appreciate its unusual difficulty. The case presented
three major problems seldom found in ordinary GATT litiga-
tion. The first, which exerted considerable influence in the
early stages of the case, was that DISC had its roots in an area
outside the GATT's customary realm of trade policy. The tax
policies underlying DISC had not been part of the GATT bar-
gain, and the government custodians of that tax policy did not
view themselves as answerable to the GATT's writ.
The second problem was a GATT legal norm that left a
great deal to be desired in terms of coherence. On the one
hand, GATT Article XVI:4 contained a bilevel-pricing limita-
tion that no one believed in, while on the other hand its seem-
ingly broad prohibition of export subsidies was subject to
reservations about territorial tax systems that were nowhere
advertised. Heroic efforts were required to overcome the
bilevel-pricing limitation, only to have the basic prohibition re-
duced to a quibble about the form that income tax subsidies
must take.
The third problem in the case was the deep schism within
GATT over subsidy policy. The disagreement, which had been
masked during the early postwar years, became more promi-
nent as the DISC case progressed. By the end the fate of the
DISC case had become a pawn in the much larger policy battle
swirling around the 1979 Subsidies Code.
If the problem presented unusual difficulties, so did the
state of the GATT legal system that was asked to deal with the
problem. The early 1970s were a time of legal uncertainty. The
complaint by United States under Subsidies Code; not pursued). See
GATT, BISD, 30th Supp. at 42-43 (1984).
European Community: Sugar Regime, GATT Doc. L/5309 (Apr.
8, 1982) (complaint by 10 smaller countries; not pursued).
United States: Subsidies on the Export of Flour to Egypt (April
1983 complaint by European Community under Subsidies Code; panel
established, but not pursued). See GATT, BISD, 30th Supp. at 42
(1984).
European Community: Subsidies on the Export and Production
of Poultry (September 1983 complaint by United States under Subsi-
dies Code; repeated consultations, suspended in 1984). See GATT,
BISD, 32d Supp. at 162 (1986).
Brazib Subsidies on the Export and Production of Poultry (Sep-
tember 1983 complaint by United States under Subsidies Code; re-
peated consultations, suspended in 1984). See id.
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tight little club of the 1950s was gone, and so were many of the
conditions that permitted its delicate adjudication machinery to
work. The GATT membership was now much larger. Its struc-
ture had been altered by the formation of the European Com-
munity, the rise of Japan, and the entry of enough new
developing countries to form a majority. The antilegalist period
of the 1960s had in some ways been a necessary breathing
space, a sort of legal truce while GATT began to digest all these
new constituents. The truce was just ending as the DISC case
began in the early the 1970s. The legal order of this new GATT
had not yet been defined.
The new GATT did have the legal traditions of the 1950s to
work with, but they were rusty from disuse, unfamiliar to the
new generation of trade policy officials, and not necessarily
suitable anyway. Every point of decision had to be confronted
again, if not as a new issue, at least as one open to argument.
In this setting the DISC litigation was almost a kind of learning
experience, a test case that allowed the new GATT to begin
hammering out the kind of legal order it wanted. That the
DISC case was thrown off course by the absence of settled an-
swers is, of course, obvious. What really ought to be
remembered, however, is its contribution to providing new
answers.
For all its shortcomings, the DISC case did succeed in es-
tablishing the most important principle of the new GATT's
legal order. By hanging on through year after year of frustrat-
ing defeats, the GATT established its commitment to adjudicat-
ing legal claims. The entire edifice of GATT dispute settlement
rests on this commitment. Establishing it was one of the most
important contributions of the DISC case.
Although the lesson was not appreciated at the time, the
DISC case also demonstrated that the new GATT retained a
surprising amount of the old GATT's decision-making capacity.
The panel's ability to override the bilevel pricing requirement
showed that GATT governments could still shape basic agree-
ment over policy into an effective consensus capable of resolv-
ing difficult legal and factual issues. This accomplishment has
tended to get lost amid the many failures of the DISC case. It
is worth remembering, particularly during negotiations about
the future of GATT litigation.
As for the procedural elements of the adjudication machin-
ery, the most important lesson of the DISC case was the insti-
tution's need for settled practice. Building such practice takes
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time and patience. So far, the improvements stimulated by the
DISC case have come primarily from working on obstacles to
effective adjudication one by one, trying out new ways around
them, and then, if something works, doing it over and over
again until it becomes part of every government's expectations.
Although improvements continue to be made in the course of
day-to-day GATT legal proceedings, governments should not
expect any dramatic increase in such progress from the Uru-
guay Round itself. It is easy to legislate better procedures, but
getting the new rules to take root is another matter.
Many procedural problems remain. The lack of an appeal
structure or some other way of handling claims of legal error is
as serious now as it was in 1976. So is the problem of establish-
ing qualified tribunals within a reasonable time. The problems
appear institutional, but dramatic institutional changes, such as
permanent tribunals or permanent rosters of arbitrators, seem
unlikely to be accepted in the foreseeable future. A better ap-
proach to these problems, at least for now, is simply to try to
keep improving the quality of legal practice in GATT. Better
inputs make better decisions, and good decisions are the best
answer to both claims of legal error and disputes over the pre-
cise composition of the decision makers.
Good panelists make better decisions than not-so-good pan-
elists, but the difference at the margin may not be as great as
panelists would like to believe. The greatest improvement in
the quality of GATT legal decisions over the past decade has
come, not from creating better panels, but from creating a legal
staff in the GATT Secretariat. The legal staff was a legacy of
the DISC case, one of its lessons taken to heart. Reinforcing
that legal staff is a logical extension of the lesson. It would
probably be the most effective contribution to the quality of
GATT legal practice in the immediate future. Individual gov-
ernments could also contribute by continuing to strengthen the
quality of their own participation.
If one views the DISC litigation as a learning experience of
the new GATT's legal adolescence, one would have to say that
GATT law has profited from the experience and is clearly
stronger today because of it. It is well that this is so, because
the problems confronting GATT adjudicatory practice are not
getting any easier. Despite continuing efforts to resolve policy
schisms and to write clearer legal norms, the litigation of the
future will probably confront as many inadequate legal norms
as it has in the past. More disquieting still is the fact that
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GATT is about to undertake a legal task substantially more dif-
ficult than it has ever attempted before. Well, almost never
before. What GATT is about to do is to ignore one of the major
lessons of the DISC case, by taking on a new area of regulation,
called "trade in services," that lies wholly outside the tradi-
tional realm of trade policy and which is guarded by a new cast
of government officials who will probably have great difficulty
in seeing why they should answer GATT's writ. If the DISC
case could speak, it would certainly have something to say
about this new enterprise. For starters, it would say, "Mind
your step."

